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This study investigates the relationship between foreign direct investment, institutional 
quality, economic freedom, and entrepreneurship in emerging markets. The research 
compares the capacity and appetite for business creation among high-income, low-income 
and emerging countries. The results are based on a panel study of data, from 2004 to 2009 
for 87 countries, using as its source “The World Bank Entrepreneurship Snapshots” to look 
at the connection between business creation, institutional quality, market freedom and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The findings reveal a strong positive relationship between 
institutional quality and business generation in all three of the above categories. 
Meanwhile, institutional quality and how this develops remains significant to business 
creation at least two years after a business is incubated, underscoring its importance as a 
contributory factor for creating an environment conducive to entrepreneurship. The 
freedom to create businesses and invest has a marked impact on business generation in 
emerging countries, while the influence of international trade appears more important as a 
spur to the genesis of business in low-income countries. Results also show that regulation 
of the free market has a short-term effect on business creation. Finally, there is a direct and 
significant relationship between FDI and business development in emerging countries. The 
effect of FDI is also felt for at least two years after the foreign investment. This result is 
consistent with “the spillover theory of entrepreneurship” (Acs et al, 2009; Görg and Strobl, 
2002; Ayyagari et al, 2010). 
 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment; Institutional Quality; Economic Freedom; 
Entrepreneurship 
 
JEL classification: F21, G18, G24 
 
 
                                        
*
 Professor, Department of Finance, School of Economics and Finance, Center for Research in Economics and 
Finance (CIEF), Universidad EAFIT, Carrera 49 Número 7 Sur 50, Medellín, Colombia, e-mail: 
hherrer2@eafit.edu.co 
†
 Florida International University, Florida, U.S.A., email: haarj@fiu.edu 
§
 Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia, email: jbenavid@uniandes.edu.co 
1. Introduction 
 
The consensus within recent research on economic development has shown how 
institutions play a large part in fostering a free market and thus, in turn, spurring economic 
growth.  Meanwhile, further studies chart the relationship between business creation and 
entrepreneurship and how this impacts economic growth and social development.  This has 
spurred interest to investigate the relationship between institutions, a free market and 
business creation. However, little research has been undertaken into the relationship 
between entrepreneurship and factors ancillary to a free market (including freedom to trade 
and to invest).  And, in the research that has been conducted to date, the results are 
inconclusive and do not allow for a consensus on whether these factors, in fact, stimulate 
business development. 
 
The majority of studies have looked at the relationship between institutions and 
entrepreneurship and whether institutional quality spurs would-be entrepreneurs to create 
businesses (Knack et al, 1995, Desai et al, 2003, Aidis et al, 2008) and, therefore, whether 
there is a direct relationship between entrepreneurship and institutions.  However, findings 
are not yet exhaustive or conclusive in this area, making the correlation between institutions 
and entrepreneurship difficult to assess, particularly in relation to emerging countries. By 
way of example, there is still scope to investigate further the influence of the timing of 
institutional change and how institutional quality interacts with the free market and FDI to 
promote business creation. 
This article is based on a panel study of data for the six years from 2004 to 2009 for 87 
countries. Using data from the registry of new companies on “The World Bank 
Entrepreneurship Snapshots”, we seek to track the relationship between company creation, 
institutional quality, a free market and FDI. To allow for comparative analysis, the 87 
countries were split into three groups. The first group comprises countries of high and 
middle income; the second group comprises countries of low income (both groups selected 
according to the proposed classifications by the Atlas method of The World Bank); and, the 
third group comprises emerging or frontier emerging countries (these countries did not 
figure in previous groups and are grouped according to classifications from The Financial 
Times and The London Stock Exchange (FTSE) Index). 
This study makes four contributions to the canon of work on the subject. First, it analyses 
the relationship between institutional strength and business creation in emerging countries, 
shedding light on the impact of institutional quality in business creation and how outside 
influences affect institutional quality which, in turn, can provide incentives for business 
creation.  As part of this dynamic, the study considers whether the greater perception of risk 
in emerging countries, manifested in government instability, corruption and poor legal 
quality, serves to stymie entrepreneurship or whether entrepreneurs devise strategies to 
overcome these adverse institutional factors. Second, it evaluates the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and aspects of the free market (in particular relative aspects such as 
financial matters, foreign trade, flow of capital and conditions for starting up, running and 
winding down a business over the lifespan of an enterprise), while considering which factor 
has the greatest influence and how gradations in the factors impact business creation. Third, 
the study examines the impact of FDI in assisting business development in emerging 
countries. This work considers whether FDI compels business creation in the hosting 
country or, actually, deters domestic company development. This aides in determining how 
external factors that impact on the domestic economy and, in turn, affect business creation. 
Fourth, the study looks at the interplay between FDI, institutional quality and the free 
market and how they combine to lay the groundwork for business development in emerging 
countries.    
This article continues as follows:  the second section reviews recent literature and considers 
the rationale for the study; the third section shows how the chosen econometric model has 
been developed; the fourth section details the data and sources used in this study while in 
the fifth section, we consider the results and how they stand up to testing. In the last 
section, we present our conclusions, consider limitations to research, and ponder 
opportunities for further research. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
2.1 Business creation and institutional quality 
 
There is a consensus among economists of the importance institutions play in economic 
development. It is believed that healthy institutions encourage investment and stimulate 
economic growth. Recent studies show that countries with solid institutions have the 
potential for greater economic growth than countries that do not (Barro, 1991; Knack and 
Keefer, 1995; Johnson et al: 1997). Other studies have acknowledged that institutional 
quality affects whether would be entrepreneurs decide to start a business (Leibenstein, 
1968; Baumol, 1990) and that there is an underlying correlation between institutions and 
entrepreneurship (Sautet, 2005; Coyne and Leeson, 2004). In this section, our objective is 
to review recent findings on the subject. In doing so, it first summarizes the institution’s 
purpose, how it is rated and how it impacts entrepreneurial activity.  It then records the 
results of recent studies to conclude. 
North (1990) defines institution as the formal and informal restrictions created by man to 
structure human interaction. These rules exist to facilitate the exchange, increase 
confidence between economic players and reduce transactional cost. Williamson (2000) 
expands this definition and includes the existence of organized entities, decisive procedures 
and regulatory structures as defining parameters within each society. The World 
Development Report: Building Institutions for Markets (World Bank, 2002)1, states that the 
country’s institutional quality depends upon the quality of its rules, what enforcement 
procedures it has in place to encourage society to observe these rules, and performance and 
guidance available for organizations. Kaufmann et al (2010) measures institutional quality 
and its relationship to other factors that lay the groundwork for effective regulation in three 
categories: (1) how governments are elected, monitored and replaced if necessary; the 
government’s capacity to devise and implement good policy; and (3) a citizen’s regard and 
the government’s regard for institutions that manage social and economic interaction. 
 
Some conditions highlight the relationship between institutional quality and business 
creation. First, there is no consistency in how the rules operate across cultures, stimulating 
some groups while disadvantaging others, depending upon the size and power of the 
economy in question.  Cultural customs or the influence of some interest groups can serve 
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to preserve institutions, even those that are inefficient. Then there is the symbiotic 
relationship between organizations and institutions in the sense that institutions tend to 
mirror the organization’s actions; and these organizations evolve within structure devised 
by the institutions. Also, changes to institutions can be slow, incremental and show 
dependency patterns (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; North, 1990). So, where institutions are 
not functioning well--for example in developing economies--institutional quality will not 
be sufficient to reverse this trend and promote entrepreneurial activity. This is likely to 
deter potential entrepreneurs from setting up a business as they weigh the perceived risks. 
To measure how the quality of institutions impacts startups, researchers aim to show the 
impact on entrepreneurs, of property rights protection, the quality of legal services, law 
enforcement and corruption control. Studies charting the relationship between property 
rights and business creation have already established how significant a factor property 
rights have been in promoting economic development. It is no surprise, then, that weak 
property rights, in turn, impede economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Svensson, 1998).  
Strong property rights protection prompts economic growth as businesses consider and take 
advantage of the significant benefits.  Meanwhile, not surprisingly, it has been shown that 
weak property rights protection increases the perception of risk for would be entrepreneurs, 
deters individuals from starting up a business and reduces their involvement in future 
development projects (Besley, 1995; Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer, 1997; La Porta et 
al., 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Vojislav, 1998; Johnson et al., 2002; Kumar et al., 2002; 
Claessens and Laeven, 2003).  Fears over poor property protection rights tend to stifle the 
creation of businesses. (Parker, 2007). One of the obvious strengths of a society which 
places value upon the protection of property rights is that it creates an environment in 
which a business owner has the luxury of acquiring and protecting assets; and it creates a 
landscape in which would- be entrepreneurs perceive advantages. Protection of property 
rights is, therefore, fundamental to the entrepreneurial process because it allows 
entrepreneurs to enjoy the fruits of their labor and, at the same time avoid losing out to a 
rogue state or another opportunistic entity (Hodler, 2009). The guarantee of secure property 
protection rights is even more critical to the relationship between investor and entrepreneur 
as the risks they shoulder and fears of losing out are reciprocal.  On one hand, investors 
may have a legitimate fear they may not recover anything if an entrepreneur acts 
opportunistically. On the other hand, the entrepreneur may fear that their idea could be 
stolen by an investor, who may have the financial means and motivation to develop the 
concept without their participation. Without adequate property rights protection, not only 
do many potential entrepreneurs see no motivation to start businesses, but potential 
investors will be more leery about providing financial support to progress their ideas. To 
conclude, then, an inadequate property rights protection system is likely to deter 
participation from entrepreneurs and investors alike.  A further upshot of poor property 
rights, as noted by Gonzalez (2005), is that it spawns several types of predatory 
entrepreneurship (greedy entrepreneurship) while reducing an investment´s return in 
productive entrepreneurship (constructive entrepreneurship). 
Researchers have also shown how entrepreneurship fails to flourish where inadequate legal 
quality, poor law enforcement and high levels of corruption proliferate. This phenomenon 
disadvantages entrepreneurial activity in several ways.  First, where there is low legal 
quality and high corruption, entrepreneurs have found political support is crucial to their 
survival and entrepreneurial development.  Consequently, there is no incentive to the honest 
entrepreneur--- who is not open to corruption (Wei, 2000; Aidt, 2009; Aidis and Adachi, 
2007; Aidis, et al., 2008). Second, an environment that fosters those kind of designs does 
not promote loyalty and encourages dishonest practices, which acts as a deterrent to new 
entrants to the business arena (Barkhatova, 2000; Aidis y Mickiewicz, 2006). Third, where 
law enforcement falters and there is a lot of corruption, this can taint the entrepreneurial 
experience (Glaeser et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 1997; Hodler, 2009) and, in turn, create 
prejudicial views of entrepreneurial activity.   
Country studies (for example, in Russia, Djankov et al., 2005 and Russia and China, Puffer 
et al., 2010) show reduced corruption levels in conjunction with favorable governmental 
attitudes towards entrepreneurship foster an environment conducive to producing 
entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, corrupt environments restrict entrepreneurial opportunities, 
diminish potential economic gains and discourage would be entrepreneurs from starting 
new businesses. In addition, the behavior of entrepreneurs who are so intent on pursuing 
their aims that they are willing to participate in a dishonest system serve only to bolster 
corrupt practices which impede access to the market from more honest entrepreneurs which 
stifles entrepreneurial activity in general (Aidis et al., 2010). 
To conclude, the scope of entrepreneurial activity is influenced by how much confidence 
stakeholders have in institutions and how willing they are to abide by the law.  What also 
matters are the police, courts and government are and how they promote laws to help the 
private sector develop and create conditions in which contracts are honored and corruption 
is not allowed to thrive. This study contributes to a body of research which analyzes the 
relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship in emerging countries, specifically 
highlighting how and when institutional quality impacts business creation and determining 
how changes in institutional quality affect business creation, and discerns how institutional 
quality, economic freedom and FDI impact the creation of businesses. 
Research shows that these forces work synergistically particularly in less developed 
economies where major institutional quality problems exist.   It begs the question whether, 
in this type of economy, the largest perceived risks of government instability, corruption 
and an impoverished legal system combine to impede entrepreneurial behavior or whether 
entrepreneurs act dynamically developing strategies to surmount those adverse institutional 
factors. 
2.2  Business creation and free market economies 
 
Kirzner (1992) considers a free market as the legal, political, constitutional and economic 
principle most likely to encourage entrepreneurship. Economic theory, in general, 
underscores the importance of a free market to development (Smith: 1776; Ricardo: 1821) 
while a number of studies show that a free market contributes propensity for an economy to 
grow and eradicate income inequality (Scully and Slottje, 1991; Gwartney et al., 1999; 
Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2006; Berggren 1999, 2003; Carter, 2007). This research 
attempts to extend that relationship on a microeconomic level and analyze the connection 
between a free market and entrepreneurship. There have been a number of studies on this 
subject (Bjørnskov and Foss, 2008; Sobel et al., 2007) but only one of them reviews data 
over the course of several years (Nyström, 2008) and none focuses on emerging markets. In 
this section, we develop the free market concept used in this study, analyze the factors that 
contribute to a free market and then summarize findings from recent research on the 
relationship between those factors and business creation. To conclude, we consider 
questions that will form the basis for investigation in this study. 
As is well-known, in a free market economy, supply and demand will determine which 
goods and services must be produced and the price for which they will be sold.  Although 
an entirely free market is but an ideal, the degree of freedom can be measured through 
reference to existing intervention mechanisms. The most common among these are: price 
controls; taxes; import and export tariffs; monetary control; subsidies and state monopolies. 
Four of these have been considered by this study, drawing from previous research that 
regarded them as being instrumental to entrepreneurial activity: fiscal intervention; 
impediments to the free movement of goods and services; the regulatory framework 
governing the ease with which one can form or close a business; and restrictions on 
investment. 
2.2.1 Freedom to start and close business 
The extent and complexity of regulations together with the costs associated with the 
formalities of setting up and closing down a business will determine how effective a free 
market is and how well new businesses can perform.  Tight control and high costs may be 
perceived as barriers to a free market which, in turn, would stifle business creation. There 
are two views among researchers on how the relationship between entrepreneurship and the 
regulatory framework operates in practice. The first belief posits that tight regulatory 
control acts to impede chaos within the marketplace and undermines confidence in the 
market, thereby engendering entrepreneurship. The counterargument is that too stringent a 
regulatory system goes hand-in-hand with higher levels of bureaucracy, paves the way for 
corruption, and impedes new business creation and expansion of existing ones. 
Among the researchers that favor the former view that tight regulatory control has a 
positive impact on entrepreneurial behavior are Glaeser and Shleifer (2003), who conclude 
that regulation is the price paid to eradicate the unfairness that may be regarded as part of 
the existing order.  Meanwhile, DiTella and McCulloch (2006) and Landier et al (2008) 
take the view that a tighter regulatory framework is borne from the need to control 
corruption; while Pinotti (2008) concludes that it is a lack of confidence in the market 
which spawns increased regulation.  Finally, the work of Djankov et al (2003) indicates that 
regulation is a natural response to the demand by the public to counter disorder, real or 
perceived, within the marketplace. 
Equally, many studies support the notion that regulation favors fledgling businesses 
(Stigler, 1971) and the regulators themselves (Krueger, 1974; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
The evidence in studies including Djankov et al (2002) shows that in countries where 
regulation inhibits entry to new businesses, there also happens to be higher levels of 
corruption.  From this flows the theory that there is a relationship between strong regulation 
and private interest protection, which acts to the detriment of the spirit of the common 
good.  Studies by Klapper et al (2006), Desai et al (2003) and Parker (2007) have found 
that industries that are generally attractive to would-be entrepreneurs across the board, will 
be less appealing in countries where the system is more bureaucratic and the regulatory 
costs more significant. 
However, Rajan and Zingales (2003) showed that even though excessive regulation may act 
in the interest of private individuals, insufficient or non-existent regulation is as likely to 
deter entrepreneurial activity. Regulation paves the way for investment, ensures property 
rights and spurs entrepreneurial activity, even though the framework has the capacity for 
manipulation by malevolent forces for personal gain.  In countries where there is high 
corruption, the regulatory framework may be either lax or excessive.  Either way, 
authorities would be foolish to ignore regulation, as a reasonable amount of regulation can 
smooth operations and oil the wheels of industry. 
2.2.2 Fiscal freedom 
Fiscal freedom is another factor critical to a free market. In economies where there are high 
taxes, the levies can be seen as a deterrent to investor and entrepreneurial participation 
within the marketplace. The findings in McMullen et al (2008) indicate tax hikes have a 
direct impact upon entrepreneurial activity, as potential entrepreneurs weigh the risks they 
will assume in setting up a business and regard this as a further impediment. 
Research has considered whether a country’s tax framework impedes entrepreneurial 
activity.  Levels of taxation can have a positive or negative impact upon the appeal of self-
employment over salaried jobs which inform decisions made by would be-entrepreneurs.  
This correlation impacts the risk-to-profit ratio, determining the relative merits of being an 
employer as opposed to being employed. For example, complex tax structures deter 
entrepreneurial activity even for those who are risk-averse as they will eventually feel the 
effect of continuing tax hikes (Kanbur, 1980; Gentry and Hubbard, 2000).  
 
Another way in which fiscal freedom impacts entrepreneurial activity is the situation in 
which high tax rates prompt individuals to look for tax-efficient ways of making a living, 
perceiving self-employment as a pathway for tax evasion (Robson and Wren, 1999; 
Schuetze, 2000). Where such choices are limited, entrepreneurship is unable to flourish 
(Blau: 1987; Parker, 1996; Long, 1982a; Long, 1982b; and Moore, 1983).  Another way in 
which fiscal freedom determines entrepreneurial potential is how low levels of financial 
freedom, in tandem with low levels of risk aversion, can foster an appetite for investment in 
risk-assets under certain conditions. For example, profit forecasts suggesting a wealth 
reduction spurred by tax hikes are more likely to increase the entrepreneur’s appetite for 
accepting the risk and starting a business (Mossin, 1968; Stiglitz, 1969). 
It bears note that studies focusing on developed countries have not supported this 
acknowledged relationship. Parker (2003) and Bruce and Mohsin (2003) found no evidence 
in these conditions that he self-employment option could provide taxation avoidance and 
evasion opportunities.  They reported that previous studies did not detail relative incomes 
of the self-employed and wage earners as a variable that could establish the significance of 
the effects of the tax rate. Feldstein and Slemrod (1980), Gordon (1998), and Cullen and 
Gordon (2002), highlighted that financial systems are complex and their interrelationships 
cannot be easily predicted; and for that reason, the relationship between fiscal freedom and 
entrepreneurship can vary depending on existing factors such as capital gains tax, income 
tax and corporate tax. 
2.2.3 International trade freedom 
Trade freedom is another key element of a free market with its attendant absence of 
regulation and barriers that impede the free movement of goods and services.  Research 
shows that government support for the development of domestic industry at the expense of 
imports can distort international commerce and add restrictions (Prebisch, 1959; Singer, 
1999; Krugman, 1995). The logical extrapolation is that large barriers to international trade 
can stimulate internal entrepreneurial rates. In that sense, it could be argued that growing 
globalization presents a hostile environment for small businesses. The consensus is that 
success in international markets is the preserve of larger companies while smaller 
companies are disadvantaged by fixed costs, their limited knowledge of international 
markets and limited skills and wherewithal to negotiate with other governments (Vernon, 
1970; Gomez-Caceres, 1997). 
Other studies contend the message is that business creation and free international trade 
enjoy a symbiotic relationship. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1999) conclude that globalization has 
created interesting opportunities for small businesses while big businesses benefit from the 
fast pace of globalization (because scope and scale allow them to exploit the opportunities), 
small businesses benefit from the advantages of the trickledown effect and marginal 
opportunism. The research of Sobel et al (2007) shows a negative relationship between 
international trade barriers and entrepreneurship. This result supports the World Bank’s 
thesis2 indicating that protectionist limitations to international trade impede specialization 
and free participation, favor known products over innovation, and limit entrepreneurship 
activity because new opportunities to make money are excluded from local entrepreneurs’ 
alternatives. 
Finally it is important to note that research has established a significant relationship 
between free international trade and entrepreneurship. Bjørnskov and Foss (2008), Nyström 
(2008) and McMullen et al (2008) bear out this theory. 
2.2.4 Freedom to Invest 
An economy that aims to trade freely will be characterized by few restrictions to the free 
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the International Finance Corporation, and Oxford University Press. 
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flow of capital investments. The importance of sourcing capital as a prerequisite to starting 
a business is no secret. Many researchers have suggested that restrictions on the flow of 
capital inhibit the growth rate in business formation (Wetzel, 1983; Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1998; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004). There is also 
extensive research establishing that the availability of financial resources, especially 
venture capital, is vital to entrepreneurial development (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; 
Henderson, 2002). Investment freedom provides fertile ground for the creation of a variety 
of instruments and mechanisms that finance entrepreneurship, paving the way for 
investment from at home and abroad.  The research which investigates more closely that 
relationship between investment freedom, FDI and business creation shall be analyzed in 
the next section. 
Our recapitulation of research already undertaken, in this section, demonstrates that the free 
market economy is a source and precondition for entrepreneurship to flourish. The 
consensus among researchers seems to be that a free market spurs would be entrepreneurs 
to look for opportunities and this unfettered approach imbues the entrepreneur with 
confidence which is critical to their success since they depend on themselves. Free market 
conditions allow participants to pursue their own plans and make their own decisions 
making entrepreneurs more eager to use their own abilities and knowledge to pursue their 
economic goals. The aim of this study is to contribute to the existing body of research on 
the subject by analyzing the interconnectivity of various factors focusing on emerging 
countries.  It aims to consider particular aspects of market freedom, particularly relating to 
financial issues, international trade, free capital flows and the freedom to start, run and 
close a business. The objective is to establish which of those factors has the greatest 
influence, how changes in those factors affect them and how the factors interact with 
institutional quality and FDI to influence business creation in emerging countries. 
 
2.3 Business Creation and Foreign Direct Investment 
  
Most research thus far has focused exclusively on domestic factors that influence business 
creation. It is only recently that researchers have shown some interest in how external 
factors such as FDI impact business creation on the local front.  The studies have attempted 
to deduce whether the presence or absence of FDI encourages or discourages 
entrepreneurial activity. 
The first raft of research suggests that entrepreneurs benefit from the presence of FDI in 
three main ways. The first, to which this paper alluded above, is that in undeveloped and 
developing countries financial sources fill the risk capital gap financing innovative ideas 
while foreign investors, pursuing greater gains, assume greater risk  (White and Fan: 2006). 
Meanwhile other studies, Alfaro et al. (2009) and Alfaro and Charlton (2008) have 
indicated that economic activity flourishes where there is international financial investment 
in those industries that have a greater dependency on foreign financial investment. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs benefit because FDI promotes improvements to infrastructure, 
regardless of whether this stems from the domestic government’s bid to look more 
attractive to potential investors or whether some of the proceeds from FDI are earmarked 
for specific infrastructure projects).  The third factor is referred to as the spillover 
phenomenon, which has been identified by several researchers (Acs et al., 2009, Görg and 
Strobl, 2002; Ayyagari et al., 2010). These studies revealed cumulative positive effects of 
FDI upon business creation in Ireland, Belgium and the Czech Republic. Their research 
revealed that FDI can have an exponential effect stimulating multiple business entries 
within the same industry (“horizontal spillovers”) and within related industries up and 
down in the same production chain (“vertical spillovers”). 
A second body of research, focusing on occupational decision models claims that FDI can 
expedite an entrepreneur’s exit through product and market labor selection (Grossman: 
1984)3. Some studies (Aitken and Harrison, 1999 in Venezuela; and Konings, 2001 in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Poland) conclude that, at best, the positive impact of FDI is 
minimal and the benefits limited to firms that have the highest foreign investment and 
dependency. Barbosa and Eiriz (2009) show that, in the case of Portugal, the impact of FDI 
is at first, positive; but long-term it has a negative impact upon business creation. Finally, 
De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) established that, in Belgium, the presence of FDI 
discouraged new entrepreneurs from setting up and hastened the demise of existing ones.  
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Grossman (1984) demonstrated that competition between companies with imported products and 
companies with direct foreign investment forced some entrepreneurs to quit as prices for products dropped 
and, with them, the entrepreneurs’ earnings compared to what they would earn in salaries. 
However, the result can be less severe or even helpful if local and foreign companies can 
learn from the experience.  
The existing body of research invites further inquiry into the impact of FDI on the business 
creation in emerging countries. Data have yet to be collected for several countries over the 
course of several years. Specifically, an investigation into whether FDI encourages business 
creation in the host country or whether it creates barriers which impede business 
development is required. There is also scope for considering how changes in the degree and 
flow of FDI can impact business creation and how FDI, the quality of institutions and free 
market conditions interact to facilitate an environment, within emerging countries, that is 
either conducive or hostile to business creation.  
3. Challenges in estimating the effects of FDI, the quality of institutions and a free 
market upon business formation: Model development 
The objective of this research is to measure how the quality of institutions, FDI and a free 
market interact to promote business creation and to compare how the behavior of these 
variables changes among emerging, high-income and low-income countries.  We then 
proceed to build three different models, one for each data set. To this end, we use the data 
panel technique as it provides the benefit of using an approach that combines cross-
sectional analysis and time series comparisons. In addition, it offers the benefit of allowing 
us to control individual heterogeneity by using a specific range of spatial and temporal 
characteristics, not observable or used in the specified variables in the models used in this 
study. 
In each regression, the test of Wald (Baltagi, 2001) was applied to establish the significance 
of variables that control temporal and spatial effects. The results indicate the significance of 
temporal effects alone for high-income countries. The purpose of the Hausman 
Specification Test is to establish if unseen characteristics have to be assumed as fixed or 
random.  Test results have indicated random effects, which is consistent with observations 
extracted randomly from a greater sample of each class of countries (Baltagi, 2001). 
Breusch and Pagan’s Test (the Lagrange multiplier to prove random effects) confirmed the 
models used which appear in equation (1) for countries of high-income and in equation (2) 
for low-income and emerging countries: 
ittititititiit yY   '4321       (1) 
itititititiitY   4321       (2) 
ii             (3) 
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denote the associated variables to institutional quality, free market, FDI and control 
variables respectively to each country in a year. t

It’s a “dummies” yearly dimension 
vector t X 1. Equation 3 allows us to control the “individual” characteristics for each 
country, i

is a random order variable with a median value  and a random deviation i

. 
The challenge is to find consistent values for the coefficients  , but this can prompt 
problems for three reasons: (1) because the errors of a country can also be correlated to 
previous errors in research for that nation, it is probable that new firm registration in a 
country at moment t is associate with new firm registration in t-1 (serial correlation); (2) 
because the errors for each country in this model can have a non-constant variance 
(heteroscedasticity); and (3) because countries’ errors can be correlated during the same 
year (contemporary correlation) due to unseen characteristics in certain countries that can 
be related to unseen characteristics of other countries. For example, a strong regional crisis 
can affect the macroeconomic variables of Latin America emerging countries and, 
therefore, the creation of companies in this region, although it does not affect the emerging 
countries of Asia and Africa. 
In order to analyze serial correlation problems in each regression, the test by Wooldridge 
was used (2002). The results in all three groups of countries reject the null hypothesis of 
serial non-correlation; therefore, the errors within each country are correlated temporally. 
The heteroscedasticity problems were analyzed by means of the Modified Wald Test, in 
agreement with Green (2000). This works even though the normal error distribution 
assumption is violated. The test failed in rejecting the null hypothesis; therefore it leads to 
assume that problem of heteroscedasticity for the three groups of countries exist. Finally, 
the Pasaran CD test (cross-sectional dependence) was used to detect whether the errors 
between countries were correlated (Hoechle, 2007). The null hypothesis of this test is that 
the residues are not correlated and it was only ineffective for the group of high-income 
countries. 
 
Beck and Katz (1995) demonstrated that the errors standard of models, Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors (PCSE), are more concise than Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) 
models when used to tackle issues with contemporary correlation, heteroscedasticity and 
auto-correlation. Since then, many studies have used PCSE in their panel’s models. Here, 
the same solution is also used to construct the model for high-income countries given the 
problems and dichotomizing variables are introduced to include the significance detected in 
temporal effects. However, since there was little temporal observation, PCSE may not be a 
valid method of correction (Beck: 2001). 
On the other hand, Hoechle (2007) indicates that one may relax the assumption of 
independently distributed errors and the estimator of random effects producing consistent 
standard errors, if residuals are not correlated between “clusters”. If the variable used to 
perform “clusters” is the panel’s identifier (in this case the countries), then the standard 
errors are consistent by heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation. Therefore, in the case of 
emerging and low-income countries, we used the random effects GLS regression robust 
standard error clusters in countries model. 
Finally, to mitigate endogenous problems between FDI and the indicators of economic 
freedom or FDI and the quality of institutions, we distinguished the differences in time of 
the variables. Therefore, in the model used, it is FDI and the amount of goods traded in t-1 
with the quality of institutions, the free market and the creation of companies in t. 
4. The Data 
4.1 Variables Justification, chosen measures and empirical implications: 
4.1.1 Degree of business creation, dependent variable. 
Entrepreneurship levels can be measured in terms of self employment (approach of the 
labor market, used among others by: Acs et al., 1994; Blanchflower, 2000; Blau, 1987; 
Bruce, 2000, 2002; Dunn et al., 2000; Gentry and Hubbart, 2004; Parker, 1996; Parker and 
Robson, 2004) or in terms of the number of companies created (ecological approach, used 
among others by: Armington and Acs, 2002; Bartelsman et al., 2004, Klapper, Leaven and 
Rajan, 2006; Klapper et al.. 2007, Klapper and Love, 2010; Verheul, 2009).  This 
investigation forces us to consider entrepreneurship in relation to creation of an 
incorporated economic unit formed legally and publicly registered to execute transactions 
with other organizations.  We have decided, for that reason, to use an ecological approach 
to the rate of entry of new companies (entry density) as a dependent variable. Entry density 
is calculated as the number of new companies registered by each 1,000 people of working 
age (using a standard range of 15 to 64 years of age). 
Data on new business registration in 87 countries from 2004 to 2009 came from the World 
Bank Entrepreneurship Snapshots (Table 1). In order to conduct a comparative analysis, we 
classified the 87 countries into three separate groups according to their respective levels of 
prosperity. The first group comprises high- and medium-income countries; the second 
consists of countries which command low incomes. These two groups were categorized 
according to the proposed classification outlined in the Atlas of the World Bank4.  A third 
group comprising emerging countries or frontier emerging countries, was identified with 
reference to The Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange (FTSE) Index5. Table 2 
shows the countries included in each group. 
4.1.2 Limitations of entry density like dependent variable 
There are some problems with the dependent variable that can distort the research. First, 
entry density is defined in legal terms more than economic terms; the fact that a company is 
registered does not necessarily mean that it is an active company. Take companies that are 
created solely as financial vehicles – these obviously are not a reflection of entrepreneurial 
activity.  For this reason, the decision was taken to exclude data from tax havens from the 
research.  
Also, researchers recommend using indicators for the rate of entry and exit of companies in 
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this kind of research, because although many new companies may fail, existing companies 
can also be liquidated for a variety of reasons from failure to acquisition. The theoretical 
model for entry and exit was developed by Joyanovich (1982) and Hopenhayen (1992). 
They emphasized the importance of using the entry-exit dynamic but factoring in failure 
rates for businesses that lose competitiveness in the market or are outmaneuvered by the 
advantages of potential competitors. These studies tend to disregard normal industrial 
dynamics except for FDI, the quality of governance and free market conditions upon 
business creation. Although industrial dynamics can influence business creation as 
companies flourish in sectors which are more productive and where resources are greater, 
institutional variables and a free market affect all economy sectors in a country. The 
difference in economic dynamics between countries is controlled economic growth and the 
amount of goods traded, more of which later. 
Research is also thwarted by how registries operate and store data in some countries for 
example how or whether ownership or company name changes are recorded. Company 
registration can also be affected by economic or legal reforms that may prompt existing 
businesses to formalize their activities. To counter this, we individualized countries, and 
when the phenomenon occurred we used dummy variables or, in some cases, removed the 
countries from the sample. 
Also, our focus has been on formalized businesses although it is accepted that other studies 
have indicated that entrepreneurs are more inclined to operate informally to evade 
bureaucracy and corruption.  It is also the case that too stringent a regulatory framework or 
increased governance may encourage entrepreneurs to set up informal business models 
(Johnson et al., 1998, and Friedman et al., 1999).  This work focuses on which factors spur 
entrepreneurs to set us businesses formally because of factors that support their enterprises 
such as legal protection, access to credit from reputable sources and access to legal sources 
of labor and external markets (Schneider and Enste, 2000). 
 4.1.3 Institutional quality 
The quality of institutions is determined according to the most recent version of 
“Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)” (Kaufmann et al: 2010). These indicators are 
available for 212 countries and record six dimensions of institutional quality, for the years 
from 1996 to 2009: Voice and Accountability (Voi_Acc); Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism (Pol_Sta); Government Effectiveness (Gov_Eff); Regulatory Quality 
(Reg_Qual); Rule of Law (Rule_Law); and Control of Corruption (Ctrl_Cor); the 
definitions and sources for the calculation of each one is in Table 1. Each indicator is 
calculated from 35 sources such as non-governmental organizations and specialized 
international organizations on the subject, for developed and developing countries. The 
scale ranges from -2.5 to 2.5; the highest values corresponding to greater institutional 
quality for each factor where a positive impact on Entry-Density is expected. 
The WGI have been used for several years in some groundbreaking studies (Wernick et al.; 
2009; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Asterly and Levine, 2003; Faccio, 2006; Gupta et al., 2002, 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Pande and Udri., 2006). The WGI also reflect the importance 
of good governance and a sound political system consolidating economic growth as set 
forth in the New Institutionalism Theory (North, 1990, Hayek, 1960; Williamson, 2000) 
and The New Theory of Economic Growth (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Olson, 2000; Knack, 
2003; Azfar and Cadwell, 2003). 
When analyzing bivaried correlations between indicators of each dimension of the WGI, it 
was established that they are high in countries of high income (0.7997 up to 0.9862), less 
high in emerging countries (0.5019 up to 0.8796) and more dispersed in low-income 
countries (- 0.3074 up to 0.8092). In the first and second examples, this behavior 
demonstrates relationship to common dimension dependency. In order to establish if there 
was dependency of a common dimension, principal components analysis was made 
(Ledesma and Bullet mold-Moor: 2007). The analysis revealed that one factor attracted the 
values of 90.84%, 70.16%, 46.11% from six indicators for high- income, emerging and 
low-income countries, respectively. The dependency is confirmed for our study focus (the 
emerging countries). It creates a new variable measuring the quality of institutions quality 
(Inst_Qual), being the mean of six factors in one year.  The use of averages to measure the 
institutional influences on entrepreneurship has already been adopted by Wennekers et al. 
(2005), Van Stel et al. (2007) and McMullen et al. (2008). 
 
4.1.4  Free markets and foreign direct investment 
There is no universally accepted method of measuring the propensity for a free market. For 
our part, we use the measures included in The Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) of the 
Heritage Foundation (Beach and Kane, 2007).  The index offers independent indicators 
associated with different categories relating to a free market. In this work, the indicators 
are: freedom to establish companies (Bus_Free); freedom to trade internationally 
(Tra_Free); fiscal freedom (Fiscal_Free); and freedom to invest (Inv_Free). Definitions and 
sources are in Table 1. These indicators are designed so that together they measure the main 
aspects of a free market in a country by reference to how the players respond to changing 
market conditions.  Other studies that used this methodology using IEF indicators are 
(Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Klapper et al., 2006; McMullen et al., 2008; Aidis et al., 
2010; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2006; Heckelman, 2000; Han and Sturm, 2000). 
The bivaried correlations between the indicators of the four IEF dimensions included in this 
work, in countries of high-income range from -0.6049 up to 0.6865, in emerging countries 
from -0.0502 up to 0.4047 and in the countries of low-income from -0.1779 up to 0.5045. 
Principal Component analysis was used to review multicolinear conformity.  “Eigenvalues” 
for the first four factors were 2.47796, 1.10683, 0.86338 and 0.73072, respectively. In 
accord with standard practice the first two factors are retained. However, four variables to 
measure a free market were used in the model as two factors alone were insufficient to 
explain the existing relationship conclusively. This approach is justified for three reasons: 
(1) a steep fall in the magnitude of “eigenvalues” is not observed; (2) to retain two factors 
would imply high costs of singularity for indicators like Bus_Free and Tra_Free (values of 
singularity of 0.6113 and 0.4219, respectively); and (3) Costello and Osborne (2005) 
mention that the orthogonal rotation does not use all the information available in these 
cases. Actually other investigators have identified the independent effects of Bus_Free 
(Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Klapper et al., 2006; Desai et al., 2003), Fiscal_free 
(Kanbur,, 1980; Gentry and Hubbard, 2000; Parker, 2003) and Trade_Free (Horst, 1972; 
Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1999) on business creation.  For these reasons, we consider each 
indicator separately in our model. 
Finally, FDI is measured by the net flow of foreign investment divided by the gross 
domestic product, with data based on the World Development Indicators compiled by the 
World Bank. This variable can be related to Inv_Free, but analysis of the variables (Table 4) 
shows the values are low in low-income and emerging countries. One theory is that while 
FDI measures investment inflow, Inv_Free is related to existing regulation. As 
demonstrated, entrepreneur-friendly regulation is essential though not, of itself, enough to 
attract FDI. As discussed, to mitigate endogenous problems between FDI and any free 
market indicator or between FDI and measurements of institutional quality, temporal 
differences in the variables is introduced. 
4.1.5. Control Variables 
The historical perspective would seem to suggest that the relationship between FDI, the 
quality of governance and a free market will work together in favor of budding 
entrepreneurs in emerging countries.  Even so, a series of control variables were included to 
ensure that the relationship between the explanatory variables and dependent variables 
could be authenticated. Five control variables were included (See Table 1 for a detailed 
description of each variable). The first variable is the amount of domestic credit available to 
the private sector, represented as a percentage of GDP, since many investigators have 
suggested poor cash flow will inhibit the rate of business formation (Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1998; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Di Patti and Dell'Ariccia, 2003). 
The second variable is GDP per capita (GDP_PCU), expressed in dollars and at current 
prices and exchange rates obtained from data from the United Nations (UNCTADstat). 
Some authors have found robust influences of this variable on entrepreneurial behavior, for 
example Lucas (1978), Acs et al., (1994) and Klapper et al., (2010). The third variable is 
the percentage of unemployed people in the total labor force (Unemployed), information 
obtained courtesy of the International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook Database. 
A number of studies link this factor to business creation (Blanchflower, 2000), (Staber and 
Bogenhold, 1993) and (Cowling and Peter, 1997). 
The fourth control variable is the rate of inflation, gleaned from the International Monetary 
Fund: World Economic Outlook Database which represents the economic atmosphere for 
each country.  It would tend to suggest that unstable economies discourage formal business 
creation. The final control variable introduced is a trade of goods and services index, 
represented as percentage of GDP (Trade), showing the volumes of imports and exports to 
and from a particular country in a specific year. The expectation here is that amount of 
compromised goods will have an impact on the number of businesses created in any given 
period.  
 
4.2 Data Description 
In Figure 1, the y axis is the number of new companies registered per 1,000 people of 
working age (using the standard measure of adults between 15 and 64 years) while the x 
axis is a measure of the quality of governance calculated according to the average of the 
World Wide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010), the net flow of foreign 
investment divided by GDP, and the index of freedom to make businesses (Beach and 
Kane, 2007). Governance is at its best in countries with high incomes, less impressive in 
the emerging countries and much smaller in the low-income countries though the trend is 
for the relationship to be positive in all three groups of countries. 
The correlation between FDI and entry density is also positive for all three groups of 
countries though it is at its most pronounced in emerging countries and falls significantly in 
low-income countries. This is because FDI is measured as a percentage of the GDP, 
therefore, in low-income countries, smaller amounts of FDI account for a greater 
percentage of GDP. The objective of this study is to demonstrate that FDI in an economy 
can stimulate business creation and, for that reason FDI is measured, not in absolute values 
but as a percentage of GDP.  In low-income countries, data show that, even though for 
some of those beneficiaries of funding, FDI can be a high percentage of GDP, it does not 
always follow it will always lead to high levels business creation. Fundamentally, this is 
because much of this investment is directed to the operation of natural resources, as is the 
case of poor Africa countries (Asiedu, 2005) or Latin American countries (ECLAC, 2008). 
This would seem to suggest that, in emerging countries, FDI is more important a stimulus 
to business creation than in the other two groups of countries examined in this study.  
The behavior of indicators to measure the extent of the free market is different from the two 
previous indicators. Minor differences are observed between the values of averages and 
ranges for the three groups of countries (Table 3).  The graph plots the index for the 
freedom to create businesses against that for entry density for new businesses – the 
relationship in low-income countries being strongest. This would tend to indicate that in 
countries where the regulatory system is more flexible, the landscape is more conducive to 
new business creation than in other countries.  As Table 3 shows, the data for all variables is 
not complete and in the case of low-income and emerging countries, we work with non-
balanced panels. 
5. Results Analysis 
5.1 New business registration determinants 
Table 5 illustrates the correlation between each of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable, for each group of countries. The variable that measures the strength of 
governance is significant and positive in all the cases. This leads one to conclude that the 
quality of institutions can explain the differences in rates of new business creation across 
the three groups of countries. The results of the equations (1), (2) and (3) show that the size 
of the associated coefficient to institutional strength is greatest in high-income countries, 
lower in emerging economies and smallest in low-income countries. It could be that, in 
high-income countries, there is greater institutional quality leading to increased entry 
density.  However, upon analysis of the relative size of the coefficient measuring 
institutional quality against the size of other, this could be done to what DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983), and North (1990) observed were institutional changes that are slow, 
incremental, continuous and show dependency patterns. Consequently, the variable reflects 
a cumulative effect most notable in high-income countries. This is borne out by contrasting 
these results with other indicators for institutional quality. Our research showed that, when 
contrasting four of the five countries that saw the largest number of new business 
formations on average per year over the past four years (the United Kingdom, 385,600; 
Canada, 194,750; France, 137,018; and, Japan, 122,816), they have consistently been in the 
top 25 countries in the world in terms of institutional quality rankings (Krause, 2010). 
The freedom to form businesses is significant and positive in all three groups of countries.  
This is consistent with the view that rigid and expensive barriers to starting up businesses 
can impede entry density and deter entrepreneurs from formalizing existing businesses, 
across all three groups of countries. Take the example of Latin America.  Based on the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Enterprise Solutions Network Project 
(ECLAC - FUDES), 2006 was a bad year with submittals at 88%, concurrently reducing 
52% of the requested requirements, a 67% reduction in the number of inscriptions process 
steps for the companies and 53% fewer entrepreneur visits to the institutions, particularly in 
low-income countries such as Bolivia and Guatemala. However, moving forward, these two 
countries saw rises of 24% and 120% in new business formations, from 2007 to 2009, 
respectively. 
Fiscal freedom has a positive impact but it is only significant in high-income countries.  In 
this group, complex tax regimes discourage would be entrepreneurs. One reason their fiscal 
freedom does not seem to be as important in lower income countries is that their smaller 
companies cannot benefit from tax breaks or subsidies and are more susceptible than larger 
companies to the costs of bureaucracy cost, as the report “Doing Business: How to Reform” 
of the World Bank (2007)6 indicates.    
Freedom to invest also has a positive impact only to a significant extent in emerging 
countries. Emerging markets are also, by definition, undergoing accelerated growth and 
industrialization. Investment freedom is, therefore, a motor driving the industrialization 
process because it promotes multiple instruments and financing mechanisms, diminishing 
obstacles to cash flow and paving the way for local and foreign investors. The emerging 
countries in our list which registered the largest numbers of business formations over the 
period have been those that have been making reforms for years that support foreign 
investment. These include Indonesia7 and Romania8 which have since the 1970s and 1990s, 
respectively, introduced regulations specifically designed to open doors to foreign 
investment”. In Brazil, Resolution No. 2689 of 26 January 2000, from the National 
Monetary Council, allowed foreign organizations to use all investment mechanisms 





Zahri, A. (1971). “Open Door Policy and Foreign Investment”. Intereconomics. 6(4): 117-20  
8
 Helmenstain, C. y Voicu, I. (1995).”An exploratory Analysis of Joint Venture Performance in Romania”. 
Institute for Advanced Studies Vienna, East European Series 17.  
http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/east/ro-17.pdf 
available to Brazilian investors in Brazil financial markets.  Meanwhile, in Colombia, since 
the 1990s pension fund (AFPs) regulation has evolved permitting foreign investment in the 
private capital fund. In this regard, this development outshines other reforms in Latin 
America9. 
Freedom to trade internationally is important for both high- and low-income countries. In 
the former, the coefficient shows negative impact; in the latter, it is positive. This indicates 
that a lack of regulation and the absence of barriers impeding free movement of goods and 
services have a negative impact on new business formation in high income countries but, 
conversely, a positive one on the same process in low-income countries, according to the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)10.  Companies in 
industrialized countries have been operating for decades in a largely globalized economy. 
Supply chains in industries have been globalized in a bid to reduce costs and increase 
productivity in order to be more competitive at a national and international level. One way 
of achieving this is to produce goods more efficiently and to use supplies from the most 
effective producers, national or internationally. This has led to fragmentation in several 
countries as businesses offshore processes. Offshoring allows businesses to buy goods or 
services from foreign suppliers or move parts of the process abroad. 
In terms of business creation, this phenomenon can be detrimental to high-income 
economies but positive for low-income economies.  That is because offshoring has resulted 
in the partial relocation of activities that have led to shrinkage in production in high-income 
countries as work moves to countries where wages are lower and public services or raw 
material cheaper. The study by the OECD shows the rate of imports over domestic 
production of intermediate goods has risen in all countries considered in this study, between 
1995 and 2000. 
Second, thanks to the relaxation of regulatory barriers to international trade and large 
increases in FDI, foreign branches of multinational companies have become more 
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important to low-income countries where they represent increasing volume of businesses, 
jobs, and research and development. The aforementioned OECD study11shows a 24% 
increase in labour forces for foreign subsidiaries from 1995 to 2001, in countries within its 
remit.  The corollary is that multinational companies in developed countries have a 
competitive advantage derived from intellectual capital so they can take advantage of 
business opportunities by creating subsidiaries and affiliated companies abroad. Affiliated 
ones not only serve local markets but become essential links in the multinational’s global 
supply chain. The OECD report has shown that exchange within the corporations has risen 
over recent years, affecting the interpretation of commercial deficits between countries. 
Part of the commercial deficit between the United States and China relates to imports that 
North American companies bring subsidiaries in China. For developed countries, 
competing in traditional industries based on low costs, is no longer an option but businesses 
have moved up the supply chain, focusing on specialist areas of expertise. This process has 
led to “de-industrialization” accounting for a drop of between 5% and 20% in 
manufacturing jobs in all OECD countries, except Portugal, with those activities 
transferring to other countries.  
All the previous issues have generated challenges for small companies in high-income 
countries. Expanding activities internationally can be a difficult step for small companies. 
There is then a trend towards mergers and acquisitions to manage the volumes required to 
support the cost of research and development, training and business administration lower 
down the supply chain, allowing enterprises to maintain productivity and retain high 
standards of quality. 
Finally, FDI has a positive impact on business creation in all groups of countries but is only 
significant in emerging countries. This activity supports the hypothesis that FDI encourages 
entrepreneurial activity in emerging countries. There is a lot of evidence supporting this 
assertion.  For example, the Offshore Location Index of A.T. Kearney11, shows that of 25 
best performing countries in 2004, 19 are classified as developing economies, 14 of them in 
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the top quartile of countries with the greatest entry density levels among emerging 
countries.  
Similarly, worldwide reports of foreign investment from the United Nations12 have, since 
2005, shown that developing and emerging economies have received the largest proportion 
of worldwide FDI.  Of the top 33 countries, targeted for research and development funds 
from overseas in 2005, 17 are considered developing economies and 14 of them are in the 
mid-high segment of emerging countries, in terms of their rates of entry density over this 
period.  This would suggest that FDI has not only has boosted business creation through 
offshoring of products and services in emerging countries but qualified functions such as 
research and development are also outsourced to companies in emerging markets. 
The OECD report shows how internationalizing I+D in developing countries has flourished 
as some countries offer a combination of low wages and good educational standards (one of 
the characteristics of emerging countries).  The presence of multinational companies has 
affected productivity in emerging economies. Although that prompts competition among 
domestic businesses, it also moves the technology and know-how to countries that can 
benefit from it. The trickledown effect of technology and knowledge from multinational 
companies to domestic ones creates training and supply chains so that local entrepreneurs 
create domestic businesses within the same sectors and related sectors, up and down the 
supply chain. 
 
5.2. The impact of timing of changes to the quality of governance, FDI and free 
market regulation in relation to business creation 
Another important stage is establishing for how long independent variables have an impact 
on business creation. The equations in table 6 illustrate this correlation. In Equations (4) 
and (5) for emerging countries, and (6) and (7) for low-income countries13, it appears that 
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entry density is dependent upon conditions that prevailed a year or two years before the 
creation of a particular business. The result shows how significant perceptions about the 
quality of governance over the past two years are to the rate of business creation in present 
times for both groups of countries. This indicates that in countries where the governance 
improves gradually and is sustained, conditions will be more conducive to business 
creation. 
Variables that measure a free market do not behave the same way as those that measure 
standards of governance. Previous values for the variables are not sufficient to explain its 
effects. This would indicate free market regulation is significant in the year in business 
creation and that an entrepreneur’s decision to set up a business is informed by current 
regulation. It is possible entrepreneurs consider prevailing stability and sustainability of 
regulation over the standards of governance before embarking on particular projects. The 
only exception is the variable measuring openness to international trade for low-income 
countries, a relationship which is relevant until the year before the entrepreneur sets up 
operations. 
Finally it is possible to see in equations (4) and (5) that the FDI effect on the creation of 
companies conserves its importance for both previous periods in the case of the emerging 
countries. The coefficient shows the significance of FDI received two to three years before 
the formation of businesses, in the current year, showing that emerging countries work hard 
to attract quality FDI (which produces economic, technological and social development) 
and not only great FDI amounts has had effect at least in the period of studied time. 
5.3. FDI Productivity in the creation of companies at emerging countries 
Tables 5 and 6 show the influence of good governance and FDI on business creation in 
emerging countries while good governance can also, in turn, be a catalyst determining how 
effective FDI is for business creation. Table 7 looks at this relationship.  To avoid endogeny 
between variables the equations consider the amount of FDI at moment t-1 with the 
strength of institutions at moment t and the dependent variable Entry Density at moment t. 
Equation (8) orders the 35 emerging markets examined as part of this study, based on their 
institutional quality.  The first independent variable measures institutional quality showing 
a direct and significant correlation with the dependent variable. The following independent 
variable multiplies FDI by one if the country’s institutional quality is in the lowest quartile 
or zero if it is the reverse.  The third independent variable does the same for the countries 
whose institutional quality is ranked in the first to the third quartiles.  The fourth 
independent variable repeats the previous process with countries whose institutional quality 
is in the top quartile of emerging countries. 
The main characteristic of this regression is the significance and size of coefficients used to 
represent the independent variables, identified above.  The size of the coefficients for 
countries with institutional quality that is better than that of those in the first quartile is 
greater than the size of the coefficients of the countries located below the first quartile 
(0.064 is greater than 0.057 and 0.007). In addition, the coefficient for countries in the top 
quartile loses its significance.  The conclusion is that size and significance of FDI 
coefficients depend on institutional quality.  It should be then that FDI has a positive impact 
on business creation in emerging countries with better institutional quality. 
In order to test the strength of the result in equation (8) equation (9) divides the 35 
emerging countries into two groups and repeats the process in equation (8) for both groups 
of countries. The first independent variable that measures institutional quality continues to 
show a direct and significant correlation to the dependent variable. The second independent 
variable, which multiplies FDI by one if that country’s institutional quality is mid-to-high 
or by zero if the reverse, shows a significant coefficient with more than five times the third 
coefficient’s variable and does the same for those countries whose institutional quality is 
mid-to-low (0.65 as opposed to 0.012). Also, the coefficient associated with countries 
whose institutional quality is mid-inferior loses significance. Again, it is shown that FDI is 
only effective in spurring business creation in emerging countries with better governance 
and FDI is most effective in this regard in countries with high institutional quality. 
Previous studies have shown that countries with better governance attract more FDI14. 
Tables 5 and 6 show better governance and FDI contribute to greater business creation. But 
table 7 is more detailed showing how institutional quality and FDI combine to spur 
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business creation in emerging countries. It has been shown that once FDI reaches a certain 
level, it is more productive and only  significant in emerging countries with greater 
institutional quality. Thus, good institutions are key to attracting FDI flows to a country 
and, once it has arrived, influence the flow of FDI, maximizing its potential and ensuring it 
has the greatest impact on business creation in the emerging countries. 
This result shows how the characteristics of good governance – included in the indicator 
used in this work to measure it – interact with FDI to promote business creation in 
emerging countries. On one hand, the measure for institutional quality used in this study 
factors in political stability, corruption control, protection for the property rights and lower 
crime rates. These factors determine where FDI may wind up in emerging countries, 
limiting the likelihood that the funding misplaced and reducing costs for those setting up 
businesses. They also increase the expected return for investors. On the other hand, the 
institutional quality measurement used in this study also includes factors such as 
representation and political control; and the effectiveness of government and regulatory 
quality. This last group of factors measures an individual’s capacity to vote in a new or back 
an existing government, depending on their ability and commitment to developing and 
implementing politics and rules that favour the development of private sector development.  
The factors, associated with good governance, determine how FDI can produce economic, 
technological and social development, and well-being through the creation new businesses 
and, in turn, new jobs. So, the quality of institutions can make a difference, ensuring that 
FDI becomes a source of financing to assist new businesses and funding improvements to 
infrastructure that benefit local entrepreneurs and lead to horizontal or vertical spillovers. 
Unless this is so, FDI will not foster much business creation in the donee country.  
5.4. The strength of the results  
5.4.1. Variation in the creation of companies and changes in the institutional quality, 
FDI and the free market in emerging countries 
The results obtained thus far have focused on how the extent to which a free market 
operates and good governance and how they inter with FDI from each country can explain 
the differences in levels of firm creation in the emerging countries. However, if the 
relationship between these three factors really mattered, the changes in these variables 
would have to show a measurable impact on the rate of entry density for the emerging 
countries. 
Table 8 shows the impact to entry density variation (of t-1 to t) of changes in several 
variables.  Institutional quality (t-1 to t), FDI (t-2 to t-1) and free market variables (of t-1 to 
t) that have demonstrated their impact in the previous regressions (the freedom to start 
businesses and to invest). In equation (10), all the variables behave as expected.  Variations 
in institutional quality, the freedom to start a business and to invest changes are significant 
with a confidence level of 95%. Meanwhile, the fluctuation in FDI is highly significant, 
recording a confidence level of 99%.  Note that equation (10) explains nearly 40% of the 
variations in entry density for emerging countries. This result is consistent with those 
recorded in the foregoing tables together with evidence that changes to a free market and 
standards of governance affect the rate of new business creation in emerging countries, 
even in the short-term. 
This does not go against the fact that investors and entrepreneurs monitor for patterns that 
favour institutional quality and a free market. As can be seen at table 6, the perception of 
institutional quality for the previous two years impact, impacts the capacity for business 
creation in the current year. This shows institutional quality for the previous two years is 
important because it informs the entrepreneur’s perception of whether the changes are 
temporary or permanent and how stable a system it is. If a country has a history of 
institutions that have shown low quality, doubts will persist about the impact of recent 
reforms and their longevity.  That may be because the influence of political leaders and the 
decisions that they made while power can be felt for some time after they have left office 
while social customs can impede the effectiveness of any reforms. 
There are several methods for testing these results against reality. First, an alternate source 
that measures institutional quality and the free market in several countries around the world 
is “the Economic Freedom of the World Index”15. We used the results obtained by the 
countries in this index from 2005 to 2009 to determine the degree of improvement 
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 Gwartney, James and Robert Lawson with Herbert Grubel, Jakob de Haan, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and Eelco 
Zandberg (2009). Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report. Vancouver, BC: The Fraser Institute. 
Taken April 17/ 2011 from: www.freetheworld.com 
(variation) to institutional quality and the openness of the free market over this period. We 
divided the countries into quartiles and analyzed the results for the 10 best performing 
countries in terms of entry density for the emerging markets reviewed in this study. Apart 
from Hungary, the other nine (Bulgaria, Macedonian, Romania, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Russia, Croatia and the Czech Republic) are in the second quartile. 
The report of “Doing Business: How to Reform” from the World Bank (2007), ob cit, 
explains, using specific examples, how these countries have adopted reforms that improve 
the quality of governance and lay the groundwork for a free market.  For example Bulgaria 
has simplified the process of company registration and taken steps to better protect 
investors; Romania has streamlined the amount of paperwork required to gain permits and 
licences and has increased disclosure requirements for the benefit of investors; Macedonia, 
has also reduced the backlog of cases in its courts of first instance thereby increasing their 
capacity to adjudicate on contractual matters that will benefit the business community. 
5.4.2 Entry density variations and FDI Changes. Emerging and frontier emerging 
countries comparison. 
“The Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange, FTSE Index”16 separates emerging 
markets intop two groups, emerging and frontier emerging markets. Frontier emerging 
markets have a tendency to be smaller, less developed and less sound among the group of 
emerging countries. According to the FTSE, frontier emerging markets are typically 
attractive to investors who look for high long-term returns, independence and low 
dependency upon other markets. Typical of a frontier emerging market is that, as the time 
goes by, it will become a market which is similar in character, in terms of risk and return, to 
a more developed emerging country. The distinction between emerging and frontier 
emerging markets is important to our work, as the latter tend to demonstrate a greater 
openness to FDI and are not subject to extreme economic and political instability in which 
case, if our results to date are representative, in frontier emerging market, the value of FDI 
would have to greater than that for the rest of emerging countries. This would be another 
method of corroborating existing results.  
                                        
16
 Method definition of the “Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange, FTSE Index” can be found at: 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/Country_Classification/index.jsp 
 
In equation (11) of table 8, impact is analyzed by the variation that has (of t-1 to t) in entry 
density changes in several variables.  They are institutional quality (of t-1 to t), FDI (of t-2 
to t-1) and free market variables (of t-1 to t) which have shown significance in previous 
regressions (freedom to form businesses and to invest). As in equation (10), all the variables 
behave as expected and changes in standards of institutional quality, the freedom to form 
businesses and to invest are significant, as together they can lead to a confidence level of 
95%. The difference in this case is that the FDI variation was distributed in two mutually 
exclusive variables. The countries were classified as frontier emerging and emerging. In 
one, FDI is multiplied by one if the country is frontier emerging or by zero if it is not. In the 
other variable, it is a constant for the remaining emerging markets that are not classified as 
frontier markets. As can be seen, equation (11) is more illuminating in this regard than 
equation (10). In addition, although the two variables for FDI are still significant in 
explaining the variation in entry density in emerging countries, the coefficient for frontier 
emerging markets is the double and shows greater levels of confidence (99%) than in the 
remaining markets within the group (90%). This result is consistent with the hypothesis 
raised at the beginning of this section and with the results of the previous tables. 
6. Summary of Results 
 Results show a strong positive correlation between institutional quality and the rate of 
business creation in all three groups of countries. They also demonstrate that the quality of 
institutions and fluctuations in this quality can continue to have an influence on the creation 
of new businesses for up to two years from the date at which that quality is measured, 
compounding the importance of the relationship. The relationship between the freedom to 
create businesses and the availability of investment has the most significant positive impact 
on company development in emerging countries. Likewise, access to international trade has 
the greatest impact in low-income countries. Previous studies have not indicated that these 
factors are significant or that they have had an effect on latest levels of business 
development.  This tends to indicate that the regulation of the free market has a short-term 
impact on business creation and that it is the current prevailing regulatory climate that 
determines whether an entrepreneur decides to start a business. However, entrepreneurs 
also pay heed to the stability and longevity of rules in terms of how they have contributed 
to the quality of institutions.  
 Finally, the study has recorded a strong direct impact for FDI upon business creation in 
emerging countries. Furthermore, where institutional quality is concerned, FDI remains an 
influential factor for at least two years from the date that quality is measured.  The study 
also indicates that the quality of institutions multiplies the effectiveness of FDI’s 
contribution to business creation. The strength of the relationship is verified by: (1) 
controlling the possible endogenous relationship between FDI and institutional quality; (2) 
establishing the significance between variations in FDI and business development; and (3) 
observing that the FDI coefficient is largest in the frontier emerging countries as opposed to 
other emerging countries. This last result is consistent with “the spillover theory of 
entrepreneurship” (Acs et al., 2009, Görg and Strobl, 2002; Ayyagari et al., 2010). 
 
7. Study limitations and further investigation 
 
In this study, the relationship between the strength of governance, a free market, FDI and 
business creation is investigated.  Although there have been some obstacles that future 
research should be able to surmount, evidence exists that some regions with strong existing 
manufacturing industries, make room for some business creation but to a lesser extent 
(Audrestsch and Fritsch: 1994). To illustrate this, in Klapper et al. (2007), it is shown that 
businesses in financial services and retail are as important in developing countries as in 
developed countries, while manufacturing and services businesses are half as important. 
This would seem to invite inquiry of a greater depth to determine why entrepreneurs in 
certain sectors are more likely to flourish in certain sectors in developing countries and not 
others. 
The relatively small sample of emerging countries and limited duration of the analysis in 
this study, as foregrounded, limit the number of variables that can be included in the model. 
Therefore other variables, that have already been identified by research as being cogent, 
could not be included. By extending the number of countries and studying them for longer, 
socio-cultural variables could be factored in which shed more light on the model and how it 
works and to illuminate the results. Also  entry density figures are available only for a few 
emerging countries so it is critical to develop models that combine economic and socio-
cultural variables to explain how entrepreneurship works in developing countries. 
Another challenge has been measuring the relationship between a free market and the 
strength of institutional quality. The correlation is a complex matrix of factors. Averaging 
several factors associated with the strength of institutional quality supposes that those 
factors have equal weight, which is not necessarily so, but begs the question how else can 
the relationship be evaluated? 
A next step may be to determine whether the factors that facilitate opportunities for 
business creation are the same as those that are needed to see businesses survive.  
Establishing determinants can assist nascent companies reach maturity and fulfill their 
social and economic potential. Also, it would be opportune to determine how these 
environmental factors can affect particular industrial sectors differently to determine how 
policy is devised and the landscape for would be entrepreneurs to create a level playing 
field. Finally, how the political and economic landscape influences entrepreneurial activity 
is ripe for further investigation. 
8. Conclusions and the implications of public policy  
This work contributes to a body of research on what sparks company creation in emerging 
markets. First it investigates the relationship between institutions and business creation, 
analyzes the impact of the timing of the degree of institutional quality and establishes how 
changes in the institutional quality affect business creation. Second, it reveals the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and aspects of a free market in terms of those 
particularly those relevant to the subject of the study such as foreign trade, flows of capital 
and the ease with which individuals may start, run and close a business) and how changes 
in these factors affect business creation. Third, it analyzes how FDI affects business 
creation.  It also determines how external participation affects the internal economy in how 
fertile an environment the countries become for business creation. Finally, it analyzes the 
interaction between FDI, the quality of institutions and the role of a free market in business 
creation in emerging countries. 
Data for the six years from 2004 to 2009 and for 87 countries from the registry of new 
companies database of the “The World Bank Entrepreneurship Snapshots” formed the basis 
for this research. To recap, in order to conduct comparative analysis, the 87 countries were 
divided into three groups. The first group comprises countries of high- and mid-high 
income; the second group consist of low- income countries, both of which groups were 
selected according to the Atlas of the World Bank. Meanwhile, a third group of emerging 
and frontier emerging countries was formed with reference to “The Financial Times and 
The London Stock Exchange: the FTSE index”. 
The results suggest that those who devise public policy must consider FDI as a catalyst to 
business creation, its impact compounded by the strength of governance.  Good institutions, 
besides attracting FDI also create regulatory frameworks to attract desirable types of FDI. 
Emerging countries must make efforts to attract FDI that produces economic, technological 
and social gains and not only great amounts of FDI. Additional indicators must be used so 
efforts are channeled in such a way as to maximize the effectiveness of FDI, creating 
businesses that last. These include job creation; value added and change of value added by 
worker; capital expenses by employee; the use of local suppliers and other forms of 
relationship with the local economy. However, of supreme importance are those factors 
related to investment in training and technology. This is because, in this sector, there is a 
greater multiplying effect prompting domestic companies within the same industry to cross-
pollinate (horizontal spillovers) and, within related industries, to have a positive effect on 
other businesses up and down the production line (vertical spillovers). To illustrate this, a 
technology company may require qualified workers who are better paid thus creating 
demand within the local market which other technology companies create demand for 
services of greater value, making room for healthy competitive from other local companies. 
As a side note, the author recognizes that the study is but a first step into what promises to 
be a rich vein of investigation into how public policy can be devised so as to attract foreign 
investment, promote a free market and create and maintain institutions that allow new 
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It is the number of new companies registered 
by each 1.000 people in labor age (age 
between 15 and 64 years) 















Corruption Control: It indicates the perception 
on magnitude in which the public power is 
exerted to obtain private gains; it includes 
great and small forms of corruption, as well as 
the use of the state to satisfy private interests. 
Upper values indicate greater corruption 
control.  Ctrl_Cor-0 it is the obtained data for 
the same year, Ctrl_Cor-1 it is the obtained 
data for the previous year and Ctrl_Cor-2 it is 
the obtained data two years back. 
World Wide Governance 
Indicators 
Daniel Kaufmann, 
Brookings Institution, Aart 
Kraay, World Bank 
Development Economics 
Research Group, Massimo 





Taken  February 2 /2011 
Rule_Law State of right: It indicates the perception of 
agents about its confidence in the existing 
norms and the degree in which they believe 
can rely that the contracts will be fulfilled and 
the property rights will be protect by the 
courts.  Rule_Law-0 it is the obtained data for 
the same year, Rule_Law-1 is the data 
obtained for the previous year and Rule_Law-
2 is the data obtained for two years back. 
The methodology for 
calculation of these 
indicators is available in: 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, 
Aart and Mastruzzi, 




(September 2010). World 
Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 5430. 
Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1682130 
Taken  February 2 /2011 
Reg_Qual Regulatory quality: It indicates the perception 
ability of a government to formulate and to 
implement politically regulations that allow 
promoting development of the private sector. 
Reg_Qual-0 it is the obtained data for the 
same year, Reg_Qual-1 it is the obtained data 
for the previous year and Reg_Qual-2 it is the 
obtained data two years back.  
Gov_Eff Effectiveness of the government: It indicates 
the perception of quality of public and 
civilians services and its independence degree 
of political pressure. It measures the quality in 
formulation and implementation and the 
commitment of the government with related 
policies. Gov_Eff-0 it is the obtained data for 
the same year, Gov_Eff-1 it is the obtained 
data for the previous year and Gov_Eff-2 it is 




Political stability: It captures the perception of 
probability that the government is destabilized 
or overthrown by nonviolent or non-
constitutional means. Pol_Sta-0 it is the 
obtained data for the same year, Pol_Sta-1 it 
is the obtained data for the previous year and 
Pol_Sta-2 it is the obtained data two years 
back. 
    
Voi_Acc Voice and Accountability: It captures the 
perception level in which the citizens of a 
country can also participate in the government 
selection. It reflects expression and 
association freedom. Voi_Acc-0 it is the 
obtained data for the same year, Voi_Acc-1 it 
is the obtained data for the previous year and 
Voi_Acc-2 it is the obtained data two years 
back. 
Dom_Cre Domestic credit to the private sector (% of the 
GDP): it refers to financial resources provided 
to private sector, such as credits, bonds and 
other receivable accounts that establish a right 
of reimbursement of principal. Dom_Cre-0 it 
is the obtained data for the same year, 
Dom_Cre-1 it is the obtained data for the 
previous year and Dom_Cre-2 it is the 
obtained data two years back. 
International Monetary 
Fund, International 
Financial Statistics and 
data files, and World Bank 




Taken  February 9 /2011 
Bus_Free Freedom to make businesses: it is a 
quantitative measurement of the ability to 
begin, to operate and to close a business, the 
score goes from 0 to 100, 100 is equivalent to 
a country with a businesses atmosphere of 
Maximum ability. The indicator is obtained 
from the weighting of quantitative measures 
taken from the “World Bank' s Doing 
Business study”, within which they are 
included: 1. Number of procedures, the 
required time, the cost and the required 
minimum capita17 to register a business; 2. 
Number of procedures, the required time and 
the cost as percentage of the entrance per 
capita obtaining a license; and, 3. The 
required time, the cost (like percentage of the 
assets) and the rate of recovery (cents by 
dollar) when a business is closed). Bus_Free-
0 it is the obtained data for the same year, 
Bus_Free-1 it is the obtained data for the 
previous year and Bus_Free-2 it is the 
obtained data two years back. 
The Heritage foundation, 





Taken  February 9 /2011La 
metodología de 
construcción de cada 





Taken  February 9 /2011 
Tra_Free Trade freedom: it is a measurement composed 
of the absence of tariff and non-tariffs 18 
barriers that affect the imports and exports of 
goods and services in each country. Tra_Free-
0 it is the obtained data for the same year, 
Tra_Free-1 it is the obtained data for the 
previous year and Tra_Free-2 it is the 
obtained data two years back. 
                                        
17 the cost and the minimum capital required to register a business calculated as percentage of earnings per 
capita 
18
 The barriers that do not include tariffs can be amount restrictions, like quotas of import or export; price 
restrictions, for example the antidumping charges; regulatory restrictions, that imply obtaining licenses; 
restrictions to the currency change and other financial controls; or the governmental monopolies, among 
others. 
Fiscal_Free Fiscal freedom: It is a measurement of the tax 
barriers imposed by the government. It is 
calculated by carefully examining the 
Maximum rate of taxes on earnings 
(corporative and individual) and the total 
amount of taxes collected as percentage of the 
GIP of each country. Fiscal_Free-0 it is the 
obtained data for the same year, Fiscal_Free-1 
it is the obtained data for the previous year 
and Fiscal_Free-2 it is the obtained data two 
years back.  
Inv_Free Freedom of investment: It is a measurement 
of the existent restrictions to the flow of 
capital of investment in a certain country. 
Inv_Free-0 it is the obtained data for the same 
year, Inv_Free-1 it is the obtained data for the 
previous year and Inv_Free-2 it is the 
obtained data two years back. 
GDP_PCU 
LGDP_PCU 
Gross domestic product per capita in dollars 
to prices and current rates of change. 
GDP_PCU-0 it is the obtained data for the 
same year, GDP_PCU-1 it is the obtained data 
for the previous year and GDP_PCU-2 it is 
the obtained data two years back. 
LGDP_PCU it is the logarithm of GDP_PCU 






Taken  February 15 /2011 
Inflation Inflation: Percentage change of prices to the 
consumer at the end of the period. Inflation-0 
it is the obtained data for the same year, 
Inflation-1 it is the obtained data for the 
previous year and Inflation-2 it is the 
obtained data two years back. 
International Monetary 
Fund: World Economic 
and Financial Surveys, 





Taken  February 16 /2011 
Unemploy Rate of unemployment: percentage of 
unemployed people of the total of the labor 
force available. Unemploy-0 it is the obtained 
data for the same year, Unemploy-1 it is the 
obtained data for the previous year and 




Merchandise traded as percentage of the 
GDP: it is the sum of the exports and imports 
divided by the value of the gross internal 
product in current dollars. Trade-0 it is the 
obtained data for the same year, Trade-1 it is 





the obtained data for the previous year and 
Trade-2 it is the obtained data two years back. 
Ltrade it is the logarithm de trade 
e=EN&format=html 
Taken  February 16 /2011 
FDI Direct foreign investment: net flow of foreign 
investment divided by the GDP. FDI-0 it is 
the obtained data for the same year, FDI-1 it 
is the obtained data for the previous year and 
FDI-2 it is the obtained data two years back.  
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Table 2.  Sampled Countries 
High income  and 
Mid-high Countries  
Low Income 
Countries 

































































































Figure 1. Institutional Quality (Inst_Qual), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Freedom To 
make Businesses (Bus_Free) and entry density (Entry_Density). The graphs show in the 
axis “and” the number of new companies registered by each 1.000 people in labor age (age 
between 15 and 64 years) and in axis “X” the calculated Institutional Quality like the 
average of the “World Wide Governance Indicators” (Kaufmann et al.: 2010), the net flow 
of foreign investment divided by the gross internal product, the index of freedom To make 
Businesses (Beach and Kane: 2007). It is shown the behavior of variables in countries of 


















Table 3.  Sample characteristics for each group of countries 
 










Entry_density 5.054567 5.541767 0.227786 27.03295 114 Dependent 
Ctrl_Cor 1.075736 1.213353 -1.184699 2.466556 114 Explanatory 
Rule_Law 0.9381536 1.078484 -1.221939 1.964045 114 Explanatory 
Reg_Qual 0.8622564 1.001375 -1.738693 1.866298 114 Explanatory 
Gov_Eff 0.9983484 1.099561 -1.179183 2.236914 114 Explanatory 
Pol_Sta 0.5574859 0.7295116 -1.442785 1.487244 114 Explanatory 
Voi_Acc 0.8160018 1.082135 -1.761545 1.826686 114 Explanatory 
Inst_Qual 0.8746636 0.9907375 -1.071778 1.867081 114 Explanatory 
Bus_Free 78.68509 15.06502 40 100 114 Explanatory 
Tra_Free 78.15088 9.458865 48.2 88.2 114 Explanatory 
Fiscal_Free 59.8807 15.11807 32 92.8 114 Explanatory 
Inv_Free 66.40351 18.8204 20 90 114 Explanatory 
FDI 4.52159 7.107739 -14.36905 40.96646 114 Explanatory 
GDPP 29940.88 17662.95 1036.345 65935.41 114 Control 
Unemploy 6.730035 3.962542 0 21 114 Control 
Ltrade 4.163011 0.4039719 3.545499 5.223792 114 Control 
Inflation 3.372518 3.561662 -0.673 19.533 114 Control 
Dom_Cre 122.1266 121.1192 9.869059 638.1389 114 Control 
Emerging Countries 
Entry_density 2.128293 2.051554 0.03 9.809634 219 Dependent 
Ctrl_Cor -0.0347466 0.5908079 -1.340383 1.483908 219 Explanatory 
Rule_Law -0.13627 0.7281831 -1.641221 1.284179 219 Explanatory 
Reg_Qual 0.2911028 0.6610867 -0.8985417 1.819906 219 Explanatory 
Gov_Eff 0.197936 0.5570391 -1.236465 1.308775 219 Explanatory 
Pol_Sta -0.1851941 0.8955626 -2.756399 1.083631 219 Explanatory 
Voi_Acc 0.0834009 0.7139255 -1.268701 1.21023 219 Explanatory 
Inst_Qual 0.0360382 0.5742054 -1.042087 1.251167 219 Explanatory 
Bus_Free 65.45814 9.513351 39.8 85.2 215 Explanatory 
Tra_Free 71.54419 12.98077 23.6 87.8 215 Explanatory 
Fiscal_Free 77.24558 8.253675 54.6 98.5 215 Explanatory 
Inv_Free 51.72093 15.65744 10 90 215 Explanatory 
FDI 5.117152 5.954955 -4.542268 52.13266 219 Explanatory 
GDPP 6483.536 5146.93 414.1115 26987.49 216 Control 
Inflation 6.263662 4.082542 -1.637 21.531 219 Control 
Unemploy 10.06957 6.13029 1.38 40 210 Control 
Ltrade 4.187696 0.5022605 2.902479 5.22813 214 Control 
Dom_Cre 47.73466 30.3723 -0.2773536 162.4562 194 Control 
Low Income Countries 
Entry_density 0.5979081 0.6947839 0.0021169 4.052327 144 Dependent 
Ctrl_Cor -0.4942648 0.4886529 -1.340383 0.8368546 144 Explanatory 
Rule_Law -0.390467 0.6140264 -1.641221 1.271157 144 Explanatory 
Reg_Qual -0.2757111 0.4647973 -1.305273 1.271157 144 Explanatory 
Gov_Eff -0.3771028 0.5140344 -1.607028 1.221884 144 Explanatory 
Pol_Sta -0.5716938 0.7605724 -2.756399 1.297433 144 Explanatory 
Voi_Acc -0.5506646 0.5301758 -1.946643 0.7465643 144 Explanatory 
Inst_Qual -0.4422095 0.3107283 -1.042087 0.4763121 144 Explanatory 
Bus_Free 58.77136 11.40614 28.8 85.6 144 Explanatory 
Tra_Free 67.23317 12.34926 22 87.6 144 Explanatory 
Fiscal_Free 78.39196 9.142858 49.7 98.5 144 Explanatory 
Inv_Free 45.17588 13.84781 20 90 144 Explanatory 
FDI 4.00505 3.598181 -2.498868 22.65197 127 Explanatory 
GDPP 1730.555 2477.187 137.9499 18878.55 117 Control 
Inflation 7.626777 6.080172 -3.729 55.27 138 Control 
Unemploy 9.400642 9.826803 0.1 77 119 Control 
Ltrade 4.123899 0.4131127 2.963742 4.915033 129 Control 
Dom_Cre 32.60142 24.3985 6.042057 113.1767 115 Control    
 
The chart shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the developed 
models. The unit of analysis is country and the unit of time is year. The first panel 
has information of 19 countries with high income, the second of 35 emerging 
countries and the third of 24 countries with low incomes. Countries with high and 
low income were categorized by the classification of The World Bank Atlas 
method19; on the other hand the emerging economies were categorized by The 
Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange: FTSE index20. The period of time 
is 6 years (from 2004 to 2009). Entry density is the number of new companies 
registered per 1,000 people of working age (age between 15 and 64). The 
following variables are the proportions of institutional quality of a country in a 
particular year (Kaufmann et al.: 2010):  Ctrl_Cor: shows the perception over the 
magnitude, where the public power is used in order to obtain private earnings. 
Rule_Law: is the agents’ perception about their confidence in the existing rules. 
Reg_Qual: is the perception of the government ability to formulate and 
implement regulations and policies that allow and promoted the development of 
the private sector.  Gov_Eff: is the perception of the quality of public and civil 
services. Pol_Sta: is the perception of the possibility that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by nonviolent or no constitutional means. Voi_Acc: is 
the perception of the level at which citizens can participated in the government 
selection, as well as freedom of expression, association and media. Ins_qual: is 
                                        
19
 The definition of the World Bank atlas methos can be find at: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications/world-bank-atlas-method. 
20
 The definition of the “Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange, FTSE Index” method can be find at: 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/Country_Classification/index.jsp 
the average of all the institutional quality dimensions proposed by Kaufmann et al. 
(2010). The followings are measures oriented to determine the freedom of market 
(Beach y Kane: 2007):  Bus_free: is the quantitative measure of the facility to 
start, operate and close a business. Tra_free: is a measure composed of the 
absence of tariff barriers and nontariff barriers, which affect the importations and 
exports of goods and services in each country. Fiscal_Free: is a measure of the 
tax barriers   imposed by the government. Inv_Free is a measure for the existing 
restrictions to the flow of capital investment on a specific country. Fdi: is the net 
flow of foreign investment divided by the gross domestic product. GDPP: is the 
gross domestic product per capita in dollars in power parity values. Inflation: is 
the percentage change of the consumer prices at the end of the period. 
Unemploy: is the percentage of unemployed people of the total available 
workforce. Ltrade: is the logarithm of the sum of all the exportations and 
importations divided by the current value of the gross domestic product in current 
dollars. Dom_Cre: is the domestic credit of the private sector as percentage of 
the gross domestic product  
 
  
Table 4. co-variances Matrix for each group of countries 
High Income Countries 
  Entry_density Ctrl_Cor Rule_Law Reg_Qual Gov_Eff Pol_Sta Voi_Acc Inst_Qual Bus_Free Tra_Free Fiscal_Free Inv_Free GDPP Inflation Unemploy FDI Ltrade Dom_Cre 
Entry_density 1                                   
Ctrl_Cor 0.5142 1                                 
Rule_Law 0.4894 0.9862 1                               
Reg_Qual 0.4683 0.8676 0.8968 1                             
Gov_Eff 0.4525 0.9771 0.9853 0.8952 1                           
Pol_Sta 0.4572 0.8492 0.8416 0.6937 0.8231 1                         
Voi_Acc 0.434 0.9256 0.9482 0.9222 0.9583 0.7997 1                       
Inst_Qual 0.4909 0.9814 0.9905 0.9243 0.9879 0.8644 0.9719 1                     
Bus_Free 0.5359 0.8336 0.8165 0.7605 0.7907 0.6081 0.7588 0.8035 1                   
Tra_Free 0.2879 0.7712 0.8034 0.7809 0.7934 0.6583 0.8033 0.8069 0.6865 1                 
Fiscal_Free 0.0106 -0.5744 -0.6049 -0.4661 -0.6237 -0.5232 -0.5934 -0.5926 -0.3849 -0.4387 1               
Inv_Free 0.2795 0.6666 0.6737 0.659 0.7008 0.5137 0.7711 0.7004 0.5223 0.5156 -0.6049 1             
GDPP 0.3445 0.8767 0.8867 0.7873 0.8666 0.7634 0.8372 0.8777 0.8164 0.7683 -0.603 0.6007 1           
Inflation -0.0916 -0.4428 -0.4666 -0.4971 -0.4884 -0.2962 -0.5495 -0.4836 -0.3812 -0.2173 0.4167 -0.5967 -0.3362 1         
Unemploy -0.3349 -0.3011 -0.2883 -0.1569 -0.2195 -0.515 -0.1443 -0.2724 -0.1675 -0.2243 0.1649 0.0635 -0.3539 -0.2422 1       
FDI 0.0733 0.0209 0.0555 0.0604 0.0268 -0.0468 0.0397 0.0303 0.0547 0.0853 0.0455 0.0071 0.143 -0.0235 -0.0557 1     
Ltrade -0.3323 -0.1168 -0.1282 -0.2265 -0.1293 0.0161 -0.2207 -0.1456 -0.1736 -0.0635 -0.154 -0.0796 0.0029 0.2734 -0.2635 0.2408 1   
Dom_Cre 0.5267 0.5161 0.5229 0.5625 0.5003 0.3903 0.4869 0.5226 0.4901 0.4211 -0.0483 0.3782 0.5438 -0.1208 -0.2955 0.1902 -0.2187 1 
Emerging Countries 
  Entry_density Ctrl_Cor Rule_Law Reg_Qual Gov_Eff Pol_Sta Voi_Acc Inst_Qual Bus_Free Tra_Free Fiscal_Free Inv_Free GDPP Inflation Unemploy FDI Ltrade Dom_Cre 
Entry_density 1                                   
Ctrl_Cor 0.3432 1                                 
Rule_Law 0.4162 0.6591 1                               
Reg_Qual 0.3856 0.7162 0.7025 1                             
Gov_Eff 0.3324 0.8796 0.685 0.7215 1                           
Pol_Sta 0.5244 0.7112 0.5364 0.5019 0.7513 1                         
Voi_Acc 0.4476 0.6814 0.6847 0.645 0.6204 0.6249 1                       
Inst_Qual 0.4922 0.8968 0.8352 0.828 0.8992 0.8213 0.8381 1                     
Bus_Free 0.2386 0.4291 0.3627 0.3114 0.4591 0.2887 0.1957 0.3913 1                   
Tra_Free 0.401 0.427 0.5803 0.5987 0.4557 0.4091 0.4953 0.5819 0.2353 1                 
Fiscal_Free 0.2838 -0.0498 -0.0966 -0.0175 -0.1038 0.0155 -0.033 -0.0512 0.0159 0.1465 1               
Inv_Free 0.3666 0.6591 0.5515 0.5612 0.518 0.4966 0.6457 0.6701 0.4047 0.2719 -0.0502 1             
GDPP 0.4496 0.5693 0.6128 0.5762 0.662 0.6767 0.5977 0.728 0.3224 0.5817 -0.1913 0.4521 1           
Inflation -0.0066 -0.3729 -0.1323 -0.1824 -0.4296 -0.2952 -0.2016 -0.307 -0.2064 -0.027 0.2437 -0.2645 -0.2158 1         
Unemploy -0.0001 -0.0119 -0.093 -0.1077 -0.1208 -0.0199 -0.0273 -0.0715 -0.1395 -0.0595 0.025 0.0766 -0.2421 0.0398 1       
FDI 0.4838 0.2378 0.1825 0.2766 0.1997 0.3012 0.1866 0.2751 0.1001 0.2168 0.0744 0.279 0.2018 -0.0055 -0.019 1     
Ltrade 0.3967 0.4012 0.3712 0.3786 0.575 0.5055 0.2085 0.4756 0.3399 0.4128 0.0992 0.1445 0.3796 -0.2156 -0.0849 0.3871 1   
Dom_Cre 0.2547 0.4698 0.2572 0.2089 0.5735 0.4042 0.1112 0.3857 0.3291 0.1835 -0.119 0.1843 0.3989 -0.3051 -0.2334 0.2244 0.607 1 
Low Income Countries 
  Entry_density Ctrl_Cor Rule_Law Reg_Qual Gov_Eff Pol_Sta Voi_Acc Inst_Qual Bus_Free Tra_Free Fiscal_Free Inv_Free GDPP Inflation Unemploy FDI Ltrade Dom_Cre 
Entry_density 1                                   
Ctrl_Cor 0.0965 1                                 
Rule_Law 0.1545 -0.3074 1                               
Reg_Qual 0.3442 0.3057 0.1552 1                             
Gov_Eff 0.1034 0.8092 -0.3634 0.2814 1                           
Pol_Sta 0.5001 0.5652 -0.169 0.3743 0.4976 1                         
Voi_Acc -0.1024 0.1485 -0.0056 0.2925 0.1186 0.1182 1                       
Inst_Qual 0.3621 0.7063 0.1292 0.6991 0.6486 0.7425 0.4715 1                     
Bus_Free 0.4086 0.4031 -0.0148 0.0568 0.4714 0.2333 -0.1722 0.2775 1                   
Tra_Free 0.3396 -0.1665 0.3386 0.3362 -0.2202 0.0257 0.0922 0.1383 -0.0316 1                 
Fiscal_Free 0.2042 -0.2484 0.0314 0.2268 -0.3653 0.063 0.0492 -0.0473 -0.233 0.5045 1               
Inv_Free 0.0607 0.2397 -0.0721 0.1341 0.2086 0.3152 0.0382 0.2614 0.2234 -0.1779 -0.0846 1             
GDPP 0.3506 0.5929 -0.1749 0.3923 0.6213 0.559 -0.0488 0.5647 0.3966 0.168 0.0761 0.0946 1           
Inflation -0.0408 -0.3184 0.2946 0.1293 -0.4609 -0.2419 0.0937 -0.1373 -0.3072 0.2454 0.2565 -0.4017 -0.2684 1         
Unemploy -0.1105 0.2468 -0.0378 -0.047 0.1228 0.2316 0.0253 0.1667 0.0212 -0.1023 -0.1634 0.1744 -0.0929 -0.1016 1       
FDI 0.316 0.1734 0.0202 0.2705 0.0217 0.2245 -0.3527 0.118 -0.0486 0.1569 0.2199 0.0113 0.1214 0.038 -0.1104 1     
Ltrade 0.4269 0.1816 -0.0164 0.2249 0.1018 0.2662 -0.1323 0.1948 0.1521 0.3853 0.2844 -0.306 0.3039 0.0383 -0.2308 0.4339 1   
Dom_Cre 0.0909 0.6175 -0.3094 0.2638 0.6248 0.3184 -0.0377 0.4017 0.3007 -0.1462 -0.3616 0.042 0.5404 -0.2565 -0.0964 0.2661 0.3463 1 
The table shows the covariance among the variables used in the developed 
models.  The unit of analysis is country and the unit of time is year. The first panel 
has information of 19 countries with high income, the second of 35 emerging 
countries and the third of 24 countries with low incomes. Countries with high and 
low income were categorized by the classification of The World Bank Atlas 
method21; on the other hand the emerging economies were categorized by The 
Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange: FTSE index22. The period of time 
is 6 years (from 2004 to 2009). Entry Density is the number of new companies 
registered per 1,000 people of working age (age between 15 and 64). The 
following variables are the proportions of institutional quality of a country in a 
particular year (Kaufmann et al.: 2010): Ctrl_Cor: shows the perception over the 
magnitude, where the public power is used in order to obtain private earnings. 
Rule_Law: Is the agents’ perception about their confidence in the existing rules. 
Reg_Qual: Is the perception of the government ability to formulate and 
implement regulations and policies that allow and promoted the development of 
the private sector.  Gov_Eff: is the perception of the quality of public and civil 
services. Pol_Sta: is the perception of the possibility that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by nonviolent or no constitutional means. Voi_Acc: is 
the perception of the level at which citizens can participated in the government 
selection, as well as freedom of expression, association and media. Ins_qual: is 
the average of all the institutional quality dimensions proposed by Kaufmann et al. 
(2010). The followings are measures oriented to determine the freedom of market 
(Beach y Kane: 2007):  Bus_free: is the quantitative measure of the facility to 
start, operate and close a business. Tra_free: is a measure composed of the 
absence of tariff barriers and nontariff barriers, which affect the importations and 
exports of goods and services in each country. Fiscal_Free: is a measure of the 
tax barriers   imposed by the government. Inv_Free is a measure for the existing 
restrictions to the flow of capital investment on a specific country. Fdi: is the net 
flow of foreign investment divided by the gross domestic product. GDPP: is the 
gross domestic product per capita in dollars in power parity values. Inflation: is 
the porcentage change of the consumer prices at the end of the period. 
Unemploy: is the percentage of unemployed people of the total available 
workforce. Ltrade: is the logarithm of the sum of all the exportations and 
importations divided by the current value of the gross domestic product in current 
dollars. Dom_Cre: is the domestic credit of the private sector as percentage of 





                                        
21
 The definition of the World Bank atlas method can be find at: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications/world-bank-atlas-method. 
22
 The definition of the “Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange, FTSE Index” method can be find at: 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/Country_Classification/index.jsp 
 
Table 5. Firms Creation Determinants  
Determinants of Firm Creation  
Dependent Variable New Firms Entry Density   
  High Income Countries Emerging Countries Low Income Countries 
  (1) (2) (3) 
inst_qual 4.197 (1.327)*** 1.019 (0.458)** 0.477 (0.195)*** 
dom_cre 0.011 (0.003)*** 0.019 (0.006)*** 0.005 (0.002)** 
bus_free 0.137 (0.041)*** 0.027 (0.009)*** 0.005 (0.002)** 
tra_free -0.129 (0.059)*** 0.003 (0.005) 0.007 (0.002)*** 
fiscal_free 0.057 (0.033)* 0.014 (0.008) 0.005 (0.003) 
inv_free 0.027 (0.029) 0.014 (0.004)** 0.001 (0.001) 
Fdi(t-1) 0.030 (0.027) 0.059 (0.007)*** 0.002 (0.004) 
gdp_pcu 0.0001 (0.00008)** 0.00004 (0.00003) 0.0002 (0.00003) 
unemploy -0.224 (0.097)** -0.109 (0.037)*** -0.004 (0.003)* 
ltrade-1 2.482 (0.797)** 0.754 (0.369)** 0.119 (0.055)* 
inflation 0.121 (0.080) 0.031 (0.017) 0.001 (0.003) 
intercept 10.214 (6.706) 2.408 (1.486) -0.41 (0.359) 
R² 0.576           
Within     0.7231   0.6474   
Betwee     0.3360   0.2870   
Overall     0.3319   0.2470   
n 114   194   99   
  Test p-value     Test p-value 
wald chi² 101.52 0.0000 265.34 0.0000 100.54 0.0000 
Hausman  6.27 0.7127 12.12 0.3545 2.59 0.9951 
Breusch-Pagan (LM) 100.28 0.0000 181.05 0.0000 118.31 0.0000 
 
The dependent variable for country i at year t is the number of new companies 
registered per 1,000 people of working age (age between 15 and 64).The 
regression (1) is done for high income countries group ; The regression (2) is done 
for emerging countries group; and the regression (3) is done for low income 
countries group. Countries with high and low income were categorized by the 
classification of The World Bank Atlas method23; on the other hand the emerging 
economies were categorized by The Financial Times and the London Stock 
Exchange: FTSE index24.  The period of time is 6 years (from 2004 to 2009). The 
independent variables are: Ins_qual: is the average of all the institutional quality 
dimensions proposed by Kaufmann et al (2010). Dom_Cre: is the domestic credit 
                                        
23
 The definition of the World Bank atlas method can be find at: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications/world-bank-atlas-method. 
24
 The definition of the “Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange, FTSE Index” method can be find at 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/Country_Classification/index.jsp 
of the private sector as percentage of the gross domestic product (Beach y Kane: 
2007): Bus_free: is the quantitative measure of the facility to start, operate and 
close a business. Tra_free: is a measure composed of the absence of tariff 
barriers and nontariff barriers, which affect the importations and exports of goods 
and services in each country. Fiscal_Free: is a measure of the tax barriers   
imposed by the government. Inv_Free is a measure for the existing restrictions to 
the flow of capital investment on a specific country. Fdi: is the net flow of foreign 
investment divided by the gross domestic product. gdp_pcu: is the gross 
domestic product per capita in dollars calculated at prices and currents exchange 
rates.  Unemploy: is the percentage of unemployed people of the total available 
workforce. Ltrade: is the logarithm of the sum of all the exportations and 
importations divided by the current value of the gross domestic product in current 
dollars. Inflation: is the porcentage change of the consumer prices at the end of 
the period. Fdi  and Ltrade are lagging in order to avoid possible endogeneity 
with Ins_qual, Inv_Free or Tra_free. The static is specified in parentheses. The 
regression (1) contains temporal effects and the coefficients are based on the 
errors estimating. PCSE (Panel Corrected Standard Errors). Moreover the 
regression (2) and (3) the coefficients are based on the errors estimating GLS 
(Randon effects GLS regression robust standard error).***, ** and *, which means 
statistical  significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
 
Table 6. Time of impact of changes in the institutional quality, FDI and regulation of free trade in 
Entry Density 
Time of impact of changes in the institutional quality, FDI and regulation of free trade in Entry Density 
Dependent Variable New Firms Entry Density   
Variable   
Emerging Countries Low Income Countries 
(t-1) (t-2) (t-1) (t-2) 
  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
inst_qual 0.548 (0.318)* 0.819 (0.420)** 0.429 (0.163)*** 0.284 (0.167)* 
dom_cre 0.014 (0.006)** 0.007 (0.247) 0.0005 (0.003) 0.003 (0.004) 
bus_free 0.006 (0.010) 0.021 (0.0121) 0.003 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003) 
tra_free 0.003 (0.007) 0.002 (0.008) 0.006 (0.001)*** 0.002 (0.004) 
fiscal_free 0.001 (0.012) 0.034 (0.0187)* 0.005 (0.005) 0.003 (0.004) 
inv_free 0.01 (0.008) 0.001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Fdi(t-1) 0.034 (0.009)*** 0.038 (0.013)*** 0.0004 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005) 
gdp_pcu 0.00001 (0.00003) 0.00001 (0.00006) 0.000006 (0.00004) 0.00008 (0.00004)** 
unemploy -0.025 (0.031) 0.034 (0.033) -0.006 (0.002)*** -0.007 (0.003)** 
ltrade(t-1) 1.102 (0.402)*** 1.121 (0.490)** 0.196 (0.077)** 0.379 (0.136)*** 
inflation -0.047 (0.019) -0.0007 (0.009) -0.005 (0.003) -0.004 (0.004) 
intercept -3.859 (2.011)* -4.321 (2.110)** -0.951 (0.678) -1.285 (0.795) 
R²                 
Within 0.2796   0.2352   0.2758   0.2510   
Betwee 0.3080   0.3854   0.3028   0.3843   
Overall 0.2854   0.3688   0.2717   0.3244   
n 194   194   115   115   
  Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value 
wald chi² 72.76 0.0000 50.18 0.0000 107.48 0.0000 77.09 0.0000 
Hausman  2.37 0.9927 9.97 0.5331 4.92 0.8962 4.91 0.9159 
Breusch-Pagan 
(LM) 234.39 0.0000 238.4 0.0000 130.59 0.0000 142.17 0.0000 
The dependent variable for country i at year t is the number of new companies 
registred per 1,000 people of working age (age between 15 and 64). The 
regressions (4) and (5) are done for emerging countries group; and the 
regressions (6) and (7) are done for the low income countries group. Countries 
with low income were categorized by the classification of The World Bank Atlas 
method25; on the other hand the emerging economies were categorized by The 
Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange: FTSE index26. The period of time 
is 6 years (from 2004 to 2009). The independent variables are: Ins_qual: is the 
average of all the institutional quality dimensions proposed by Kaufmann et al 
(2010). Dom_Cre: is the domestic credit of the private sector as percentage of 
the gross domestic product (Beach y Kane: 2007): Bus_free: is the quantitative 
measure of the facility to start, operate and close a business. Tra_free: is a 
measure composed of the absence of tariff barriers and nontariff barriers, which 
affect the importations and exports of goods and services in each country. 
Fiscal_Free: is a measure of the tax barriers   imposed by the government. 
Inv_Free is a measure for the existing restrictions to the flow of capital 
investment on a specific country. Fdi: is the net flow of foreign investment divided 
by the gross domestic product. gdp_pcu: is the gross domestic product per capita 
in dollars calculated at prices and currents exchange rates.  Unemploy: is the 
percentage of unemployed people of the total available workforce. Ltrade: is the 
logarithm of the sum of all the exportations and importations divided by the 
current value of the gross domestic product in current dollars. Inflation: is the 
porcentage change of the consumer prices at the end of the period. Fdi  and 
Ltrade are lagging two periods in order to avoid possible endogeneity with 
Ins_qual, Inv_Free or Tra_free. The statistical is specified in parentheses. The 
coefficients of the regression are based on the error estimation due to the 
countries aggrupation (Randon effects GLS regression robust standard error 
clusters in countrys). ***, ** and  * *, which means statistical  significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively.  
 
 
                                        
25
 The definition of the world bank atlas method can be find at: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications/world-bank-atlas-method. 
26
 The definition of the “Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange, FTSE Index” method can be find at: 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/Country_Classification/index.jsp 
Table 7. FDI Productivity in firm creation at emerging countries. 
 
FDI Productivity in firm creation at emerging countries 
Dependent Variable New Firms Entry Density   
  (8) (9) 
inst_qual 0.665 (0.376)** 0.695 (0.362)* 
Fdi(t-1)*Ins_qual (mitad superior)      0.065 (0.011)*** 
Fdi(t-1)*Ins_qual (mitad inferior)     0.012 (0.011) 
fdi(t-1)*Ins_qual (<1er quartil)  0.007 (0.022)     
fdi(t-1)*Ins_qual (1er-3er quartil) 0.064 (0.033)*     
fdi(t-1)*Ins_qual (> 3er quartil)  0.059 (0.007)***     
dom_cre 0.019 (0.009)** 0.019 (0.008)** 
bus_free 0.018 (0.010)* 0.013 (0.008) 
tra_free 0.004 (0.006) 0.002 (0.005) 
fiscal_free 0.001 (0.010) 0.0007 (0.009) 
inv_free 0.006 (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) 
gdp_pcu 0.0001 (0.0004) 0.00001 (0.0005) 
unemploy -0.032 (0.040) -0.030 (0.041) 
inflation(t-1) 0.739 (0.394)* 0.763 (0.436)* 
ltrade(t-1) -0.015 (0.012) -0.023 (0.015) 
intercept -2.586 (1.607) -2.663 (1.721) 
R²         
Within 0.6293   0.6413   
Betwee 0.2547   0.2730   
Overall 0.2749   0.3007   
n 194   194   
  Test p-value Test p-value 
wald chi² 260.09 0.0000 147.27 0.0000 
Hausman  0.88 0.9999 7.01 0.8572 
Breusch-Pagan (LM) 189.49 0.0000 142.07 0.0000 
 
The dependent variable for country i at year t is the number of new companies 
registered per 1,000 people of working age (age between 15 and 64). For 
emerging countries group categorized by the classification of the Financial Times 
and the London Stock Exchange: FTSE index. The period of time is 6 years (from 
2004 to 2009). The independent variables are: Ins_qual: is the average of all the 
institutional quality dimensions proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2010). Fdi: is the net 
flow of foreign investment divided by the gross domestic product. Fdi*Int_qual 
(upper half):  multiply the FDI by one if the institutional quality of the country is 
in the upper half or by zero in the contrary case. Fdi*Int_qual (lower half): 
multiply the FDI by one if the institutional quality of the country is in the lower half 
or by zero in the contrary case. Fdi*Int_qual (upper quartile): multiply the FDI 
by one if the institutional quality of the country is in the upper quartile or by zero 
in the contrary case. Fdi*Int_qual (quartiles 2 and 3): multiply the FDI by one 
if the institutional quality of the country is in the quartiles 2 and 3 or by zero in the 
contrary case. Fdi*Int_qual (lower quartile): multiply the FDI by one if the 
institutional quality of the country is in the lower quartiles or by zero in the 
contrary case. Dom_Cre: is the domestic credit of the private sector as 
percentage of the gross domestic product (Beach y Kane: 2007): Bus_free: is the 
quantitative measure of the facility to start, operate and close a business. 
Tra_free: is a measure composed of the absence of tariff barriers and nontariff 
barriers, which affect the importations and exports of goods and services in each 
country. Fiscal_Free: is a measure of the tax barriers   imposed by the 
government. Inv_Free is a measure for the existing restrictions to the flow of 
capital investment on a specific country. gdp_pcu: is the gross domestic product 
per capita in dollars calculated at prices and currents exchange rates.  Unemploy: 
is the percentage of unemployed people of the total available workforce. Ltrade: 
is the logarithm of the sum of all the exportations and importations divided by the 
current value of the gross domestic product in current dollars. Inflation: is the 
porcentage change of the consumer prices at the end of the period. Fdi  and 
Ltrade are lagging in order to avoid possible endogeneity with Ins_qual, 
Inv_Free or Tra_free. The statistical T is specified in parentheses. The 
coefficients of the regression are based on the robust errors estimation due to the 
countries aggrupation (Randon effects GLS regression robust standard error 
clusters in countrys). ***, ** and *, which means statistical  significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively.  
 
Table 8. Firm creation and changes in institutional quality, FDI, market freedom in emerging 
countries. 
Firm creation and changes in institutional quality, FDI, market freedom in emerging countries. 
Dependent Variable New Firms Entry Density  
  (10) (11) 
Inst_qual(t) - Inst_qual(t-1)  1.446 (0.643)** 1.346 (0.621)** 
dom_cre (t) - dom_cre (t-1) 0.019 (0.011)* 0.018 (0.010)* 
Fdi(t-1) -Fdi(t-2) 0.038 (0.014)***     
Fdi(t-1) -Fdi(t-2) (Países Emergentes)     0.029 (0.014)* 
Fdi(t-1) -Fdi(t-2) (Países Emergentes de Frontera)   0.058 (0.018)*** 
bus_free(t) - bus_free(t-1) 0.011 (0.004)** 0.011 (0.004)** 
Inv_free(t) - Inv_free(t-1) 0.011 (0.005)** 0.010 (0.004)** 
inflation(t-1) -0.023 (0.013)* -0.023 (0.013)* 
ltrade(t-1) 0.087 (0.069) 0.083 (0.069) 
intercept -0.175 (0.317) -0.162 (0.315) 
R²         
Within 0.3026   0.3085   
Between 0.6745   0.7494   
Overall 0.376   0.3982   
n 194   194   
  Test p-value Test p-value 
wald chi² 30.72 0.0001 36.48 0.0000 
Hausman  3.55 0.8298 3.32 0.9126 
Breusch-Pagan (LM) 8.00 0.0047 10.74 0.0010 
 
At the regressions (10) and (11) the dependent varible for theconutry i and the 
year t is the variation between t and t-1 in the number of new companies 
registered per 1,000 people of working age (age between 15 and 64). For 
emerging countries group categorized by The Financial Times and the London 
Stock Exchange: FTSE index. The period of time is 6 years (from 2004 to 2009). 
The independent variables are: Ins_qual(t)- Ins_qual(t-1): is the variation 
between t and t-1, of the average of the institutional quality dimensions proposed 
by Kaufmann et al. (2010). dom_cre(t)-dom_cre(t-1): ): is the variation between t 
and t-1, of the domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of the gross 
domestic product. Fdi(t-1)- Fdi(t-2): ): is the variation between t-1 and t-2, of the net 
flow of foreign investment divided by the gross domestic product. Fdi(t-1)- Fdi(t-2) 
(emerging countries): multiplies by one the variation between t-1 and t-2 of the 
net flow of the foreign investment divided by the gross domestic product if the 
emerging country is not classify as frontier economy according to The Financial 
Times and the London Stock Exchange: FTSE index. Fdi(t-1)- Fdi(t-2) (Frontier 
emerging countries): multiplies by one the variation between t-1 and t-2 of the 
net flow of foreign investment divided by the gross domestic product, if the 
emerging country is classify as frontier economy according to The Financial Times 
and the London Stock Exchange: FTSE index. bus_free(t)-bus_free(t-1): is the 
variation between t and t-1, in the quantitative measure of the ease to start, 
operate and close a business (Beach y Kane: 2007). Inv_free(t)-Inv_free(t-1) is 
the variation between t and t-1, the extended of any restrictions  on the flow of 
investment capital in a given country (Beach y Kane: 2007).  Inflation: is the 
porcentage change of the consumer prices at the end of the period. Ltrade: is the 
logarithm of the sum of all the exportations and importations divided by the 
current value of the gross domestic product in current dollars. The coefficients of 
the regression are based on the robust errors estimation due to the countries 
aggrupation (Randon effects GLS regression robust standard error clusters in 
countrys). ***, ** and *, which means statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.  
 
 
